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Abstract
IDENTIFYING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PRIVATIZED, PARTIALLY
PRIVATIZED, AND NON-PRIVATIZED STATE FOSTER CARE SYSTEMS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY EXAMINING EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS

By: D. Crystal Coles, Ph.D.

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University.
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2015
Chair: Patrick Dattalo, Ph.D.
Professor
School of Social Work

Privatization of the public child welfare system has become increasingly popular since its
introduction in the early 1990s. State governments that initiate the privatization of foster care
services rationalize the changes with claims of effectiveness and/or increased efficiency of
services for children and families. There has been no real focus on identifying what efficiency of
the system means for children and their families, nor what aspects of effectiveness focuses on
children in foster care. As a result, the unintended consequences of this total restructuring of
foster care bureaucracy, through the privatization of the state foster care system – and its impact
on the organization service delivery and the child – are as yet unknown.
The primary aim of this study is investigate whether or not there are differences between
state foster care systems and their levels of privatization, as well as the differences in states’ rates
of efficiency and effectiveness with regard to a child’s trajectory of experience within the foster
care system. Through the analysis of existing data on state-based child welfare service
xii

performance this project intends to increase the knowledge regarding the privatization of public
child welfare systems and its effect on efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery.
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Chapter One: Statement of the Problem
The Case
This was the second time that Jasmine (age 9) and James (age 7), had been in foster care
custody. The two children had experienced numerous foster home placements and had not been
consistently in school. In their previous case, parental rights had been terminated, so Jasmine
and James’ case was transitioned to an adoption status and a maternal cousin, Alexis, and her
husband Steve decided to pursue adopting the children. Given that Alexis and Steve were
relatives, the adoption process was quickly finalized and the children were placed with them
almost immediately.
One day, Jasmine went to school and conveyed to a teacher that she had been unable to
complete her homework as a result of being locked in her room for the evening. When the
teacher asked her to describe what she meant, Jasmine explained that when she misbehaved she
had things taken away and was locked in her bedroom. Her teacher became concerned and after
discussing the situation with her principal, she decided to report the incident to the authorities.
The report immediately triggered an investigation that resulted in finding that there were issues
within the home environment; however, Jasmine’s bedroom had some major concerns. First, the
walls, floors, and windows were all painted black. Second, there was no bedroom furniture,
clothes, toys, or anything else in the room; the room was empty. Third, small holes on the floor
were filled with urine and feces. During an interview with the parents, they explained that
Jasmine had a variety of bad behaviors. Thus, for every bad behavior they took items out of her
room, which they also conveyed was supported by Jasmine’s psychologist and psychiatrist.
When asked about the urine and feces, and their awareness regarding Jasmine’s defecation
within the room, the parents explained that they indeed aware of it. Alexis and Steve believed
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that Jasmine deserved to be locked in her room and that Jasmine would urinate and defecate in
her room to spite them. Thus, they felt it appropriate for her to stay within the room in its
condition.
In addition to concerns with Jasmine’s room, there were locks on the refrigerator, and
each of the cabinets in the kitchen. When searching the home, investigators also noticed that
there were cameras located in each room of the home, including the bathroom. Interviews were
conducted with each child and it was determined that the children were terrified of their
adoptive parents. As a result of the alleged emotional and mental abuse that each child had
experienced, Jasmine and James were placed into state’s custody and immediately entered the
foster care system for a second time.
Receiving the Case
From the time that the referral for a case consult was received, it was evident that this
case was different. For one thing, there was already a more seasoned clinician assigned to the
case and she had been observing visits for a few weeks. The other clinician, Chantel, was also a
social worker and had worked with children and families as a clinician for almost 20 years. I
received the case referral after a year of the siblings’ placement in foster care. I staffed the case
with the case manager who explained that the case was at a standstill because the parents had
completed all of their court orders and the therapists involved in the case were unable to provide
insight into whether or not the children should return home. The case manager also felt that
Jasmine’s behaviors were considered the primary reason for the actions of the parents, so the
primary focus of the case had been assisting the parents in learning how to handle a child with
behavioral concerns. At this point in the case, there were no valid reasons to not return the
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children home; however, the case manager’s supervisor wanted to have a more thorough clinical
consult completed. Consults were conducted by a licensed clinician and included caregiver-child
visitation observations, meetings with therapists or other professionals involved within the case,
and consulting with the children about their opinions and experiences.
Meeting Alexis and Steve
For our first meeting, we arrived prior to the children’s scheduled visit, so that we could
meet with Alexis and Steven alone. We discussed their perspective of the case and it was evident
that they felt that Jasmine was at fault for the children’s placement in custody. The couple
provided us with a tour of the home and it was apparent that Jasmine’s room had only bare
necessities including dark eggplant painted walls, a bed, and a dresser; James’ room, however,
was a traditional child’s room filled with toys, clothes, and decorated walls. After viewing the
rooms, we were led downstairs towards a dark hallway into the basement. The playroom was
entirely made out of cement—all of the walls and the floor were cement. It was a very cold room
and many toys were placed on shelves that went from the floor to the ceiling. These shelves were
on all but one wall, which instead had a sofa. The sofa had a small table in front of it with a
small child size desk next to the sofa.
Once the children arrived to the visit, we observed numerous instances in which the
children appeared frightened to speak, move, or act without permission. And as Chantel and I
became more familiar with the parents and the children, the levels of emotional abuse became
apparent. Alexis often chastised Jasmine for minor infractions, and forced her to watch James
reap the benefits for his intensely obedient behavior. James would not complete any action
without Alexis’ or Steve’s permission and he spoke so quietly that I often had to be close to him
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to hear him. It was evident that there were extreme levels of emotional and mental abuse present,
so Chantel and I staffed this case often with our supervisor. She suggested we search the
literature to support our clinical findings; however, there was very little about emotional abuse;
particularly in social work literature. We were beginning to feel stuck and we struggled with
how we could ensure that these children would not return to a toxic, emotional, and mentally
abusive home environment. Even worse, we had nothing from clinical literature to support our
observations. We had no idea what to do.
The Meeting
After having the case for three months, and observing weekly visits, Chantel and I
received an email from the administrator of our department that explained that there was a
mandatory staffing for this case that required our presence. Having worked for the agency for
many years, it was abnormal for an administrator to become involved in a case at this level.
After meeting with our supervisor, Chantel and I staffed the case privately and realized the
meeting would include not only our supervisor, but the case management team and the director
of our department as well. It was at that moment that we realized that this was not a staffing, but
that there were some concerns regarding our work with this family.
The day of the meeting, Chantel and I worked to come to a consensus about the case.
While we were at our cubicles, I noticed the director, administrator and case management team,
including their supervisor and director going towards the staffing room. In that moment, I knew
that this meeting was going to be different. In all the years I had worked at this organization, I
had never seen administrators involved with cases like this one unless something was seriously
wrong. It caused me to consider: what were Chantel and I about to walk into?
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When we got into the room, the administrator began by asking about our progress on the
case and Chantel began to respond. Before discussing our findings, Chantel requested that she
be able to provide some case background. While she was discussing our perspective and
observations, I began to observe the people seated at this table. They appeared to have little
interest in the details Chantel discussed. And as I was sitting there, I realized that Chantel and I
were in over our heads. Chantel continued to talk about the case and at one point the
administrator abruptly stopped and said, “I’m going to stop you now, because that information
is irrelevant. We’re not going to talk about the kids, because that’s not what’s important here”.
Chantel, seemingly frustrated at this point, continued to speak and I could tell that she was
thinking, “Maybe they do not understand where we are coming from”. However, I had realized
something: this was never about the kids. There had been some troubling concerns with the
agency recently, and as clinicians, we often found ourselves in advocacy situations for our
clients and against the agency’s administration. And it felt like we were losing most of the time.
But in that meeting and in that moment, when our administrator said “We’re not talking about
the kids, because that’s not what’s important here,” I finally understood what this was all about:
the money regarding the privatization model taking over Kansas’ public child welfare.
After the meeting, I began to wonder: when had we, foster care professionals, switched
the focus of our system from having an emphasis on the child? It was after that meeting that I
decided that our administrators were focused on the wrong thing. I mean, were there other
agencies going through this? Why was the child not the focus of practice? And how did
privatization fit into that? These questions led me to understand that the system needed to
change and I needed more education if I wanted to truly take part in altering the foster care
system.
5

Beginning the Research Journey
When I began the doctoral program, my substantive area had an emphasis on developing
an instrument to measure emotional abuse. My hope was to develop an instrument that could
assist clinicians in a manner that would have been helpful for me in practice. However, as I
considered developing the instrument and how it would be utilized in care, it occurred to me that
the instrument was not the place to start. To understand how the child welfare system had
shifted its focus away from being focused on the child, I had to understand policy and the
differences between systems that were privatized and not privatized. So, I started from the
beginning and realized that to truly understand privatization, policy, and impact of the two on the
foster care system---I needed to start with understanding how and why states had become
privatized. This is the journey to understanding the complexity of privatization within the
context of policy, its application within the foster care system and its connection to the children
like Jasmine and James that we serve within the foster care system.
The Transition of State Foster Care Systems: Extent of the Problem
Over the last few years, numerous states have decided to transition from state-run foster care
human service models created through legislation and charged to implement public social
policies (O’Connor & Netting, 2009) to managed care privatized models that are grounded in
performance-based contracting (Steen & Smith, 2012). State governments that initiate the
privatization of foster care services rationalize the changes with claims of effectiveness (Chi et
al., 2003) and/or increased efficiency of services for children and families (Freundlich &
Gerstenzang, 2003; Stone, 2002; Gillespie, 2000; Petr & Johnson, 1999). Please note that there is
no clear definition for what constitutes efficiency for states or service providers; however there
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are some instances in which state foster care systems allude to efficiency and cheaper service
provision being the same.
The decision to transition the public child welfare (PCW) system to a privatized system
has implications for a complex causal system—social systems that are inherently complex as a
result of attending to societal needs (Stone, 2002). The idea of applying privatization to the
public child welfare system was a response to the challenges that the federal regulations
presented to state governments. Various plans for privatization were discussed throughout the
individual states, with several states favoring a large-scale transition to privatization; other states
decided to apply privatization at a slower and partial rate, or not at all.
Evaluating States’ Decisions to Privatize
In evaluating states’ decision to privatize, the priority for many states appears to be an
emphasis on transforming a dysfunctional system into one that ensured that federal outcomes
were met by the state, rather than focusing on improving the way the state-ran system provided
services to children and families (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003). Often times, states do not
complete any prior research on how privatization may affect the children and families in the
foster care system, the employees working for the state, or the agencies that were bidding on
services (Loson, 2009; Zullo, 2006). For example, in the early stages of privatization, the state of
Kansas worked with state-funded agencies to identify performance outcomes that contractors
would be required to meet (Loson, 2009). Given the lack of data being collected by the state, the
development of outcomes was not based on research, statistical information, or other sources of
data. This resulted in the development of performance outcomes that were inappropriate for
systemic objectives and unattainable for contractors (Loson, 2009).

7

The following are examples of outcomes developed for foster care agencies within the
state of Kansas (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003, pg. 59):
•

Outcome 1: Children are safe from maltreatment,
o 98% of children in out-of-home placement will not experience
substantiated abuse/neglect while in placement

•

Outcome 2: Workers will maximize the well-being of children,
o 70% of children will have no more than four placement settings
subsequent to referral
o 70% of all children will be placed with at least one sibling
o 80% of youth aging out of the child welfare system will be prepared for
transition to adult life as indicated by a score of 20 or more on the
Preparation for Transition to Adult Life Checklist

•

Outcome 3: Children move toward permanency in a timely manner,
o 40% of children placed in out-of-home care are returned to the family,
achieve permanency, or are referred for adoption within six months of
referral
o 65% of children placed in out-of-home care are returned to the family,
achieve, permanency, or are referred to adoption within 12 months of
referral to the contractor
o 90% of children who are reintegrated do not reenter out-of-home
placement within one year of reintegration

•

Outcome 4: Family members will be satisfied with the services provided
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o 80% of participants, including caregivers and youth ages 16-21, will
report satisfaction as measured by the Client Satisfaction with Family
Reunification Services Survey 90 days after referral or at case closure
The outcomes that were developed for Kansas were also used as examples for other states
that implemented privatization (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003). However, in assessing the
outcomes, it is evident that states did not take into account the situational reasons for a child’s
placement in custody or the social worker’s capacity to assist the family in meeting these
outcomes (Hubel, Schreier, Hansen, & Wilcox, 2013). Each of the goals has measurable tasks
attached to them that can be considered unreasonable and difficult for service agencies to
maintain, given the trajectory of the child’s experience in foster care. For instance, when a child
enters foster care, the child is placed in an emergency placement for a short period of time; the
child is then transferred to another placement with the intention of it being a permanent
placement (Font, 2014). Those two placement moves are counted towards Outcome #2 which
states that a child should not have more than four placements. Even before any situation takes
place that might contribute to disrupting a placement, such as a child harming themselves or
others, the ability to meet Outcome #2 is highly unlikely, particularly given that privatization has
been found to increase the number of placements a child has while in care (Steen & Duran,
2013).
The Implication of Power within the Implementation of Privatization
Whenever systematic restructuring takes place, there is a reallocation of power within
that structure (Stone, 2002). Privatization was described as a way to enhance the economy and
develop efficiency in the public child welfare system.

Power and politics theory acknowledges

the importance of influence, politics, and informal power within organizations, beyond
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traditional views of authority as legitimized power (O’Connor & Netting, 2009). Politics are a
crucial aspect regarding the decision to privatize (Henig, 1989) and cannot be dismissed as an
inconsequential aspect of the process of privatization (Morgan & England, 1988). Privatization
is based on rational behavior (rational choice theory), thus emphasis is placed on maximized
production for the cheapest cost (Lewis & Widerquist, 2002; Stone, 2002).
Political frame and political power influence the nature of the foster care system. Thus,
political figures had large amounts of power provided by constituents; powerful agencies had a
mid-range level of power; while direct service workers had little power in the decision to
privatize. Political power and economics contributed to the decision-making process in
determining states’ decision to privatize and whether or not other states should transition to
privatization (Steen & Smith, 2012; Henig, 1989).
The Intersection between Policy and Practice
Social welfare policies have largely been developed on the basis of inequities (Quadagno,
1999) and states’ utilization of a privatized model may have indeed contributed to a system that
is now outcome based; outcomes which appear to be removed from the reality and the well-being
of the child. Though the use of a privatized public child welfare system may shift the
responsibilities of service provision from the state to a contractor, the state continues to maintain
an ultimate level of power and control of the system. In other words, the implementation of
privatization enhances the state’s power within the public child welfare system while lessening
its responsibility because contracts in privatization extend the domain of the state into private
organizations responsible for service provision.
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Ambiguity surrounding implications of privatization and the meaning of the state’s
transition to privatization for children, families, and service providers has contributed to policy
makers placating both sides of the argument (Zullo, 2006). The vagueness regarding the
implications for privatization allows for the assumption that the policy is inclusive of multiple
perspectives; however, only the rational perspective of the policy is accepted, not the nonrational
perspective (O’Connor & Netting, 2011). Gaining an understanding of the implications of
privatization through research is highly important. Political decisions seem to have guided other
states to adopt the Kansas model and other models of privatization without rigorous
understanding of the implications across all of the complex systems involved in public child
welfare.
Knowledge regarding the dialectal interaction between policies and practice (Quadagno,
1999) has the ability to assist social workers in power enactment— the utilization of individual
power—which can increase consciousness within social work practice. The politics behind
privatization are supported by political validation and goal claims that privatizing public child
welfare brings positive results. Those results are primarily related to children proceeding
through the system at a faster pace (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003), identification of
performance standards to hold agencies accountable (Unruh & Hodgkin, 2004), as well as costeffectiveness (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003). But is that enough to call privatization a
success?
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Research Gaps Regarding Systemic Efficiency and Effectiveness in Privatized Public Child
Welfare Systems
Despite the vast amount of literature related to the operations of the public child welfare
system, minimal research has been conducted regarding privatization generally and its levels of
efficiency and effectiveness specifically. Essentially, the implementation of privatization was
meant to ensure cost-savings for the state, which was believed to ultimately save the state money
through increased efficiency (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003). Within the literature,
effectiveness is discussed as a primary purpose for PCW systems to privatize; however, there is
minimal definitive discussion as to what effectiveness can be considered and even less regarding
the effectiveness of privatization in the context of PCW. Privatization has been identified as an
option that would enhance government efficiency and could provide a better level of
effectiveness regarding public child welfare services (Ram, 2012; Freundlich & Gerstenzang,
2003). However, without data to support these claims, or operationalized definitions of
efficiency and effectiveness, the impact of privatization on the PCW system is unknown.
Purpose of the Study
When considering the complexity of privatization of the PCW system and the
implications of its functioning on the various systems involved including organizations, workers,
children and families it serves, an assessment of the multifaceted policy is a necessity.
Identifying the state’s reasoning for its use of privatization, while also detecting the issues
related to the implementation of a privatized model for the state, contractors, and the
organizations responsible for service provision, is important. This supports an inference that
though implementation of the model of privatization provided a level of organization in a chaotic
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system, the impact of the transition and the implementation process on the system created levels
of concern that were overlooked due to political exigencies.
States that have implemented models of privatization have done so as a result of
believing that privatization increases efficiency of the system and effectiveness of the services
provided. However, the rationale behind privatization does not support the opinion that
privatization models produce cost-savings or effective services (Hubel, Schreier, Hansen, &
Wilcox, 2013). Concomitantly, the conceptualization of system effectiveness has little definitive
context and has not been assessed in the research. An examination of national child welfare
system data centered on efficiency and effectiveness may provide additional insight into this
issue. The primary aim of this study is investigate whether or not there are differences between
state foster care systems and their levels of privatization, as well as the differences in states’ rates
of efficiency and effectiveness with regard to a child’s trajectory of experience within the foster
care system.
Goals of Research
The public child welfare system is charged with the duty to protect children is inclusive
of three primary sections including family preservation and child protection services (CPS),
adoption, and foster care (Pecora et. al, 2010). Of the three sections, foster care services have
maintained the highest costs for many years (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003); thus, foster care
services are central to the public child welfare system and can serve as a stable comparative
measure of efficiency and effectiveness. This research is intended to add to the empirically based
information regarding present and future approaches to privatization of child welfare. This
dissertation seeks to answer the following questions:
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1. Are there differences between privatized, partially privatized, and non-privatized state
foster care systems?
2. Are there differences in rates of efficiency for privatized, partially privatized, and nonprivatized state foster care systems?
3. Are there differences in rates of effectiveness for privatized, privatized, and nonprivatized state foster care systems?

Through the analysis of existing data on state-based child welfare service performance
this project intends to increase the knowledge regarding the privatization of public child welfare
systems and its effect on efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery. This information while
important to state policy makers is also crucial to the whole system including organizations
contracted to provide services. Transitions to privatization have large effects on organizational
practice and have been seen to be problematic for organizational structure and practice
(Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003). Non-governmental organizations interface with government
policy at federal, state, and local levels; thus an analysis of privatization can provide an in-depth
understanding of the phenomena, as well as what is occurring to the children within privatized,
partially privatized, and non-privatized systems.
The Dataset
This study utilized a secondary data analysis to investigate questions related to the
efficiency and effectiveness of privatization of the PCW system. The Adoption and Foster Care
Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) data are collected annually by The Children’s
Bureau and funded by the Administration on Children, Youth, and Families, U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (Adopting and Foster Care Analysis & Reporting System, 2002).
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The data collected are case based data provided by the primary worker, gathered at the unit and
agency level, provided to state and then compiled for submission to the federal government. The
data are housed in the National Data Archive on Child Abuse and Neglect (NDACN) at Cornell
University. The dataset includes aggregated state-level data regarding every child placed within
the foster care system in the United States. The methodological approach to analysis of the
dataset is described in Chapter 3.
Findings from the Study
Chapter four presents findings from the analysis conducted with the AFCARS data. The
chapter begins by summarizing the steps taken to prescreen the data. This is followed by the
procedural steps taken within the analysis of the data. Next, the chapter presents the results from
the analysis, as well as support from the literature regarding the findings. Lastly, the chapter
ends with a summary of the findings.
Discussion and Implications from the Study
In chapter five, findings and implications from this study are discussed. As mentioned
throughout this study, research regarding privatization of public child welfare is fairly limited.
An aim of this project was to approach a complex issue, with an existing national dataset, to
begin the examination of a difficult issue and document it with empirical evidence. The chapter
ends with a discussion regarding the implications of the study of the study with regard to social
work education, social justice, policy, social work practice, and research.
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Chapter Two: Literature Review
Introduction
The American government has maintained a role ensuring the safety and well-being of
abused and neglected children for over 100 years. In the beginning of its involvement, the
government assumed a role primarily as a financier, as opposed to providing the oversight and
funding that federal and state government maintains today. Earlier in child welfare history,
orphanages were run by individuals who often sought funding from community members, and
eventually, governmental support. However, as times progressed, the identification of child
abuse & neglect as an increasing area of concern for states precipitated the formation of
extended governmental involvement with concern for the safety and well-being of the child
(Pecora et al., 2000) at the federal, state, and local levels of government.
Consequently, the U.S. government has utilized social contracting—a contract which
provides the ground rules for service provision between the government and a nonpublic
business entity—(Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994), as a mechanism for service provision and
production since the 1930s and 1940s (Collins-Camargo, McBeath, & Ensign, 2011;Casey
Family Programs, 2010; Humphrey, Turnbull, & Turnbull, 2006). These social contracts have
contributed to reshaping the delivery of services typically provided by states, to include utilizing
a private third-party to act on behalf the state. The transition to a social contract mechanism is
often times precipitated by federal policies that impact state service provisions and require that
states alter their systemic functioning in an effort to meet certain federal requirements. Social
contracting is often a mechanism within the public child welfare system and grounded in a model
termed “privatization”. The two primary policies that have contributed to state’s transitioning to
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privatization are the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA) and the
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA).
State governments that initiate the privatization of foster care services rationalize the changes
with claims of effectiveness (Hubel, Schreier, Hansen, & Wilcox, 2013; Chi et al., 2003) and/or
increased efficiency of services for children and families (Hubel, Schreier, Hansen, & Wilcox,
2013; Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003; Stone, 2002; Gillespie, 2000; Petr & Johnson, 1999). For
example, states such as Kansas may develop specific service indicators or outcomes such as: the
number of times a child has been removed from the home; the number of placement settings a
child experiences during their placement in foster care; or the number of days spent in out-ofhome placement. All of these service indicators could be considered a measurement of both
increased quality and lowered system costs. These indicators are often portions of a social
contract between a state and a private agency; thus, providing guidelines for agency service
provision, as well as connecting expectations to the overall costs of care for the child in custody.
The privatization of state child welfare services varies from state to state; which means there
is not one specific model of privatization implemented in the United States. However, there
appear to be three primary strategies of privatization that states use in public child welfare: fully
privatized, partially privatized, and non-privatized strategies which will be the focus of this
discussion. In states that utilize a fully privatized system, all sections of the public child welfare
system are privatized, with the exception of investigative services, also known as Child
Protective Services (CPS). In state systems that use a partial privatization systemic strategy, one
or two sections of the public child welfare system are privatized (e.g., foster care, or foster care
and adoption only). Lastly, non-privatized state public child welfare systems take the
responsibility of providing the full range of services to children and their families deemed in
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need of services (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003). Note that foster care services are a
consistent focus in all the above strategies.
To better understand the implications of privatization and its relationship to the public child
welfare system, research that focuses on the efficiency and effectiveness of privatization in a
foster care system is needed. In addition, a more thorough comprehension of privatization is
needed due to privatization’s impact on the organizations contracted to provide services.
Transitions to privatization have large effects on organizational practice (Freundlich &
Gerstenzang, 2003; Meezan & McBeath, 2003) and are often problematic for organizational
structure and practice, which can further negatively impact a child’s trajectory of experience in
the public child welfare system. Non-governmental organizations (both non-profit and for profit
types) interface with government policy at federal, state, and local levels; thus an analysis of
privatization can provide an in-depth understanding of the phenomena and its functionality at
many different levels. Also, in analyzing data regarding the impact of privatization, the results
could serve as an impetus to alter child welfare system functioning for the betterment of service
delivery for the child. The following section highlights the transition from privatization as a
business mechanism to its utilization as a managed care strategy within the public child welfare
system.
Understanding Privatization
Privatization as a Business Model
In the United States, the evolution of privatization began in the 1980s as an emerging concept
in the government’s public agenda. Privatization can be described as “the provision of publiclyfunded services and activities by non-governmental entities” (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003,
p. 2). In 1987, the President’s Commission on Privatization was established to develop a
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stronger inclusion of private interests’ inclusion in policy in the areas of air-traffic control,
prisons, the postal service, and schools (Henig, 1989). Throughout its development, the concept
of privatization was recognized as a legitimized link between governmental actions and societal
circumstances (Henig, 1989); in other words, a social contract. Within the area of
business/government partnership, the intent of privatization is to lower costs of services, and
through effective service provision increase a competitive economic market (Van Slyke, 2003).
For instance, in response to societal need for assistance with resources such as transportation and
waste, state governments have accessed private providers to ensure effectively meeting the needs
of society while controlling costs (Gibelman, 1998). Thus, public arenas such as education,
transportation, waste removal, electrical utilities and management of prisons have employed
strategies of privatization that have proven to lead to cost savings and more efficient (if not
effective) services (Van Slyke, 2003; Blank, 2000). However, evidence of privatization leading
to cost-savings for social service providers is limited (Van Slyke, 2003).
Models of privatization are grounded in an economic perspective that is based in the study of
economic markets for specific services and goods; thus supporting the concept of increasing
efficiency via competition (Bodog et al, 2009; Henig, 1989) in the service provider market. From
an economics perspective, microeconomics has an emphasis on the economic market without
partiality for the well-being of individuals (Lewis, & Widerquist, 2002). Instead, there is more of
a focus on particular goods and the difference among the agents producing or selling goods.
While in the American government, as it pertains to social welfare, the government maintains the
responsibility for the provision of resources for the poor and the oppressed (Axinn & Stern,
2007). The conceptualization for models of privatization has a foundation in the application of
economic principles pertaining to the governmental position/responsibility regarding the welfare
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state and the redefinition of the state governmental service provider practices and responsibilities
(Henig, 1989).
As a business model, privatization is grounded in the belief that the relationship between the
public and private sector of business markets can be utilized as a strategy to reverse budget
problems in the public sector. That thinking has led to the supposition that privatization can
contribute to successful and cost efficient changes in policy and practices in public child welfare
(Henig, 1989). These beliefs stem from an understanding that privatization allows the
government to do the work of administering (monitoring and evaluating) and thereby assuring
effective services (Henig, 1989), as opposed to directly producing or delivering them in a cost
savings method. The model of privatization allows the transitioning of past state governmental
practices to the private sector, employing a contractual relational technique, along with the
addition of economic theory to formulate a “political strategy for institutionalizing change”
(Henig, 1989, pg. 664).
Efficiency and effectiveness in business. As a result of privatization being grounded
within a business model, it is essential to consider how efficiency and effectiveness are discussed
within the business world. In business, efficiency and effectiveness are key elements in
achieving a successful business performance (Lu & Hung, 2011; Mouzas, 2006). Efficiency—the
allocation of resources (Lu & Hung, 2011) has a variety of meanings and dependent upon the
specific business to determine how efficiency is described and measured. Despite the varying
ways that businesses may define efficiency, it is often tied to production; or in other words: costs
(Lu & Hung, 2011; Mouzas, 2006; Barros & Mascarenhas, 2005). Conceptually, the belief is that
maintaining lower costs will increase profits (Osadi & Israel, 2010). On the other hand,
effectiveness—a business’s ability to generate strategic growth (Lu & Hung, 2011; Mouzas,
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2006), is typically defined in similar ways for many businesses (Lu & Hung, 2011; Mouzas,
2006). Thus, effectiveness is often a continuous process and regularly negotiated between the
business and its consumer, rather than only produced by the business (Mouzas, 2006). In spite of
their definitions, efficiency and effectiveness are connected in business in that for a business to
ensure maximum efficiency, the product provided must maintain a balanced level of
effectiveness (Yu & Lee, 2009). Even though efficiency and effectives are connected, the
primary goal of all businesses is to minimize cost and maximize profits (Osadi & Israel, 2010),
which is a foundational belief grounded in an economic perspective.
The Economics Behind Efficiency and Effectiveness
Historically, social welfare has been largely impacted by economics (Lewis & Widerquist,
2002) and the policies that social workers are enacting and implementing are a result of the
current economic structure principally based in business approaches that favor efficiency and
effectiveness. In economics, efficiency—the allocation of an unalterable good to ensure the
betterment of the individual while not placing an individual in a worse position (Lewis &
Widerquist, 2002) – is crucial to the economic market (Blackstone, Buck, & Hakim, 2004). For
example, if there were only two businesses providing a service in a particular economic market
with one business having seven clients and the other having 12, each business needs to grow and
expand their client base to assure economic viability; however, to do so would require that one
business lose the clients that the other gains based on assumptions of who wants or needs the
service being provided. This ensures that the allocation of goods are efficient (services to 19
clients by one business at a lower cost than for the work of two) within the market the good is in.
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As a concept, effectiveness—the performance of an entity (Ram, 2012), is grounded in
traditional organizational functioning. Effectiveness can be linked to achievement of desired
outcomes and products (O’Connor & Netting, 2009; McConnell, Burwick, & Perez-Johnson,
2003) at a sufficient level of quality to determine proof that effectiveness is occurring within an
organization. In the previous example, services would be both efficient and effective if the
service provided to the 19 clients in one business was equal in quality to that which was provided
by the two businesses before moving to a more efficient or low cost way of delivering services.
These efficiency and effectiveness expectations may not be as straightforward in the context
child welfare system.
Understanding Efficiency and Effectiveness in the Context of Public Child Welfare
The influence of politics on economics and its impact on public child welfare knowledge
related to a political framework inclusive of economics is also of interest when comprehending
the functionality of models of privatization (Hansenfield & Garrow, 2012; Morgan & England,
1988). The two primary components of economics and business that dictate the overall
functioning of the foster care system, --efficiency and effectiveness—(Freundlich & Gerstenzang,
2003) remain the criteria for successful organizational performance and productivity. In
searching the literature, many authors discuss the importance of efficiency and effectiveness with
relation to privatization in public child welfare (Hubel, Schreier, Hansen. & Wilcox, 2013; Casey
Family Programs, 2010; Myslewicz, 2007; Craig et al., 1998; Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003;
Gillespie, 2000), and the dubiousness of the effectiveness of the child welfare system (Pecora et
al., 2010). However, there were only two sources that specifically defined efficiency—costs of
services provided (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003; Gillespie, 2000) – and one source that
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defined effectiveness—client improvement (Gillespie, 2000). These definitions guide the work
of this project.
In a study conducted by a government alliance inclusive of the American Public Human
Services Association, Child Welfare League of America, and the Administration for Children
and Families (2001), a survey was conducted with 45 of the 50 states in the United States that
provided public child welfare services. The study found that the average state operating budget
for foster care services was $285 million, with a range from $45 million to $1.3 billion per year.
These services are inclusive of the development of appropriate state outcomes including: safety
for children, timely permanency, appropriate case load levels for social workers (Steen & Smith,
2012; Roin, 2011; Steen & Duran, 2010), accountability for agency actions, as well as the
necessity of more social workers in agencies (Lewandowski, 1998). These findings suggest that
the efficiency of the foster care system must continue to be emphasized as part of the overall
functioning of the child welfare system.
In an effort to attain the utmost cost-saving model that ensures the efficiency of the system,
states utilize various models of privatization. State governments often claim that privatization
has the capacity to ultimately save the state money (Steen & Smith, 2012; Chi et al., 2003;
Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003); however, research has not supported this perspective.
Knowledge regarding child welfare bureaucracy with its rules and structure for order (Lipsky,
2010) and the interconnectedness of children within the bureaucratic environment of the foster
care system, is critical for adequately assessing the efficiency implications and consequences of
privatization. Here we are not simply able to look for the lowest cost per unit of service to
determine efficiency. To date, this appears absent from considerations of privatization.
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Within the child welfare system shaped by federal and state policies, defining and assessing
effectiveness in the foster care system has been especially problematic when considering the
children that the system is charged with protecting. For instance, it has been consistently reported
that children of color are disproportionately placed within foster care system (Blackstone, Buck,
& Hakim, 2004; Pecora et al., 2000; Craig et al., 1998). African-American children comprise
17% of the population, yet 55% of the children waiting to be adopted are African-American; this
is in stark contrast to Caucasian children, who comprise 66% of the population and make up 26%
of those awaiting adoption (Blackstone, Buck, & Hakim, 2004). The effectiveness question here,
first, is whether or not the system is actually protecting children at risk; and, secondly, whether
or not those identified at risk achieve permanency.
African-American children are the most likely to “age out” or exit the foster care system
without permanency and out of the system without needed resources to assume adult roles in
society (Pecora et al., 2000). Children who age-out of the foster care system are more prone to
experience homelessness, continue the use of social services, and attain high rates of failure to
complete their secondary education (Pecora et al., 2000) Thus, if the primary purpose of the
foster care system is to identify and enact permanency options (Yampolskaya et al., 2004) for
children identified at risk (Pecora et al., 2000) and a child exits the foster care system without a
permanency resource, then ageing out of foster care can be viewed a failure of the system
(Blackstone, Buck, & Hakim, 2004; Craig et al., 1998). The aging out of so many children is also
a measure of effectiveness failure, no matter how cheaply the foster care services were during
these children’s time in foster care. Within foster care can efficiency and effectiveness be
achieved equally? The move to privatization is based on an untested assumption that the answer
is “yes”.
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Managed Care: The Conceptual Ground for Child Welfare
The move to privatization of public child welfare systems did not happen overnight. Instead
there has been a slow movement in that direction. Privatization was modeled after the managed
care—a set of strategies controlling service cost and utilization— (Cook et al., 2004, pg. 387)
method used within the health care system (Steen & Smith, 2012; Blackstone, Buck & Hakim,
2004). Developed in the 1970s, managed care was formulated to restructure the health care
system fee-for-payment structure (Cook et al., 2004; Westat & Chapin Hall Center for Children,
2002; Wulczyn & Sheu, 1998), which was believed to be the primary reason for the higher costs
of medical care.

Within traditional managed care strategies, patients selected health providers,

so the providers determined the costs for services and third-party vendors (insurance companies)
paid for the costs (Westat & Chapin Hall Center for Children, 2002). The underlying intention
of a managed care strategy is to maximize value for all parties involved (McCullough & Schmitt,
2000). A primary component of a managed care strategy is the entity responsible for setting the
rules of the managed competitive market for contractors is a role that is typically represented by
the state government. Based in the premise of a competitive economic market, a managed care
strategy utilizes purchasing services from third parties, which are often times represented by
private organizations or agencies. Managed care functions as a mechanism of rational
microeconomic principles related to need, supply, and demand of the market (Wheelan, 2010;
Lewis & Widerquist, 2002) as discussed earlier.
Based on the perceived past success of cost savings and – potentially – improved services,
state foster care systems began to embrace managed care as a model of systemic reform,
transferring managed care’s foundational principles to the foster care system (Garstka, CollinsCamargo, Hall, Neal, & Ensign, 2012; Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003; Wulcyn, 2000). The
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medical model of managed care presumes that the formation of a competitive contract based
market controls the cost of care, while maintaining the quality of the services provided (Mariner,
1995). Over the last few years, numerous states have decided to transition from state-run foster
care human service models to privatized practice models influenced by managed care models
and grounded in performance-based contracting (Steen & Smith, 2012; Ortega &Levy, 2008). In
this way, the state provides contracts that include agency outcomes or performance based
outcomes, as a means of measuring the private agency’s progress (University of Kentucky, 2006;
Martin, 2005). The contractual agreement between the private agency and the state, along with
the formulation of performance based outcomes is demonstrative of a managed care model of
service provision.
By the year 2000, states such as Kansas, Tennessee, Ohio and Illinois had shifted portions of
foster care services towards a managed care strategy of functioning (Wulczyn, 2000). As a
primary rationale for privatization, state governments that initiate the privatization of foster care
services cite effectiveness (Chi et al., 2003) and increased efficiency of services for children and
families (Ortega &Levy, 2008; Petr & Johnson, 1999). Other benefits of these systems
transitioning to privatization include an increased focus on targeted outcomes, as well as the
increased financial funding from the federal government that is provided via enacted foster care
related polices (Courtney, 2000). Child welfare agencies are typically contracted to provide
services, which consist of case management, foster care services, adoption, child protective
services, and investigative services to the community (Everett et. al, 2007; Cyphers, 2001). With
the exception of investigative services, private agencies are contracted to provide services and
retain sole responsibility (care and control) of children in state custody. In other words, although
states maintain custody of a child when services are provided, the state extends guardianship
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responsibilities to the private agency, thus moving from managed care including purchase of
services (POS)—contracting the private sector for service delivery— and case management to a
privatization model (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003). The following is a discussion of each
stage of a shifting process, which should demonstrate the logical move to privatization as an
assumed strategy to achieve both efficiency and effectiveness in at least the foster care segment
of the child welfare system.
Case Management
In an effort to define a process for the management and purchase of direct services, case
management has been utilized as a method within the privatization model (Carey, 2008). In
using case management as a mode of transferring service provision to the private market, state
systems introduce direct practice services as a mechanism to reinforce and ensure efficiency and
effectiveness of service delivery. Thus, POS contracting promotes a goal of improving service
provision for children in out-of-home care through increased contact with families, supervisory
reviews, and frequent case reviews (Collins-Camargo, 2012). As a result, case managers
maintain a role in which the professional assesses the needs of clients and are provided the
authority to make primary decisions related to day-to-day case decisions (Casey Family
Programs, 2010). Services are then selected based upon matching which services case
management can provide for the lowest cost (Collins-Camargo, 2012) per unit, also being
monitored by the case manager.
Theoretically, case management is an efficient tool because the management of services
decreases costs services for the system, while also ensuring the effectiveness of service delivery
through usage of POS; thus ensuring that POS enables case management operationalization in
foster care. Within the varying state foster care systems, health care models such as managed
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care strategies, have been utilized as examples for privatization formats (Collins-Camargo,
McBeath, & Ensign, 2012; Casey Family Programs, 2010; Myslewicz, 2007; Loson, 2004;
Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003;). The similarities to the managed care model include: one
point of entry for services, pooled funding, and specific pay rates (Steen & Duran, 2010;
Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003; Flaherty et al., 2000). In contrast to a typical noncompetitive
fee-for-service contract, POS contracts typically offer three forms of pay rates that are used by
state foster care systems with each having specified terms: capitated, capped allocation, or case
rate (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003). A capitated payment structure is a format in which
contractors receive an annual set payment for each child in installments determined within the
contract between the state and the private contractor (Myslewicz, 2007). Within this model, new
clients do not generate new income for the state, but this does allow for a vast amount of how
providers allocate resources (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003; Wulcyn & Sheu, 1998). The
consequence of this model is that the financial burden is shifted to the provider.
Whereas a capped allocation format is a predetermined fixed amount per client that covers all
services to be provided by the contractor (Loson, 2009; Unruh & Hodgkin, 2004; Freundlich &
Gerstenzang, 2003). The primary difference between a capitated payment structure and a capped
allocation is that services are tied to a targeted population, as opposed to a general population of
potential clients to be served (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003).
Lastly, a case rate form of payment allocates funds for a per child basis and is a rate for the
total cost of care for the duration of a child’s placement in care, regardless of the services
provided (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003). Thus, unlike the other two forms of payment, the
case rate format generates new income for each child that enters care. Typically, formulated case
rate payment structures are based on organizational milestone achievements and performance
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goals, along with the understanding that contractors are required to accept all referrals that the
state sends to them (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003; Zullo, n.d.). These varying financial
models shift the financial risk of the state government to private contractors who assume the
responsibility of service provision (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003).
Despite the vast amount of research related to the public child welfare system, there is
limited research that addresses the concern of the unintended consequences and implications for
children within the foster care system when transitioning to a privatization practice model (Steen
& Smith, 2012). There has been no real focus on identifying what efficiency of the system
means for children and their families, nor what aspects of effectiveness focuses on children in
foster care. As a result, the unintended consequences of this total restructuring of foster care
bureaucracy, through the privatization of the state foster care system – and its impact on the
organization service delivery and the child – are as yet unknown.
Purchase of Service Contracting in the State Foster Care System
Privatization of the public child welfare system has become increasingly popular since its
introduction in the early 1990s. The effectiveness, cost, and scope of the public child welfare
system has traditionally been a topic of interest among legislators, court systems, and social
workers in the public and nonprofit private agencies serving the children and their families in the
child welfare system.
Prior to using privatization mechanisms within the public child welfare system, states
developed case management approaches that included the use of select elements of the private
sector for service delivery via purchase of service contracting (Ezell, 2002; Gibelman, 1998).
POS contracting is the process by which the government enters into a formal agreement with
another entity for a good, thus, purchasing services from the private sector (Gibelman, 1998).
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POS became popular in the 1960s when legislation amended the Social Security Act to permit
states to enter into agreements with agencies outside of the government for service provision
(Martin, 2005; Gibelman, 1998). Later, POS was extended for services such as daycare for
children, mental health (Wieman & Dorwart, 1998), and other direct services. While there are
not examples for public child welfare, within the area of mental health, privatization was used to
initiate effective and efficient services by creating incentives for alternatives to state mental
hospitals, as well as the development of outpatient services such as community based care
(Wieman & Dorwart, 1998). Given the benefits demonstrated from privatization in the other
arenas (Ram, 2012; Henig, 1989), models of privatization were used to transition governmental
provision of services into a more systematic approach to case management.
Aside from being a mechanism for the provision of services, POS contracts maintained cost
elements that are related to case management services provided. In foster care, POS contracts
were used as a contract between a private agency and the state in an effort to provide more
efficient and effective services (Garstka, Collins-Camargo, Hall, Neal, & Ensign, 2012; Ezell,
2002). Thus, the nature of POS contracts transitioned the role of the child welfare worker
towards a bureaucratic position that consisted of frequent interaction with court systems, state
service systems, education systems, therapeutic systems, and a plethora of other systems as a
result of the family system interacting with a variety of services provided in those areas
(Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003). Once workers became involved with the various systems
interacting with their cases, it became apparent that levels of knowledge related to system
functioning for clients and the concept of economics was needed. These consistent interactions
between the various systems provided a link to begin supporting steps that promoted a systemic
move toward privatization.
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According to a study conducted by the Alliance for Children and Families, American Public
Human Services Association, and Child Welfare League of America (2001), the mean (average)
public child welfare state operating budget was $285 million, with a range from $45 million to
$1.3 billion per year with the average length of time that a child spent in foster care being 13.4
months (Child Welfare Information Gateway, 2013). Despite the costs of care and given the
average length of time a child spends in the care of the state, in 2012, 23 states had declined in
their ability to ensure that children are reunified with their families within 12 months or placed
within another permanent placement (Child Welfare Information Gateway, 2013).

Despite the

payment mechanism, the primary privatization methodology used within the foster care arena is
performance-based contracting. Performance-based contracting (PBC) is a process in which the
state government develops performance targets that are a specific measurable factor in categories
such as ensuring child safety, reuniting children with their families in a timely manner, and
maintaining a child’s cultural ties to their community (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003). The
rationale for the use of PBC is that it: provides cost-savings to the government; develops
systemic and organizational outcomes; has organizational performance based incentives and
develops measurable performance based standards of practice (Myslewicz, 2007; Martin, 2005).
For social work practice, this places an emphasis on goal development for the agencies providing
services, establishes accountability for the organizations providing services, and forms oversight
or monitoring of the services provided by the state government (Myslewicz, 2007).
Federal Policies and Privatization
Over the last several decades, the direct involvement of the U.S. government within the
area of child welfare has accelerated the formation of policies that directly impacted the
development and functioning of the public child welfare system. Two primary polices that have
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had major implications for the functioning of the public child welfare system. Those two federal
policies include the Adoption Assistance Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA) and Adoption
and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA) (Pecora et al., 2000). Those two policies have prompted
states to identify mechanisms to adhere to federal guidelines, while also in forcing state systems
to face financial challenges. This has ushered in the state utilization of privatized practice
models as a mechanism to ensure that the federally mandated state services were met, as well as
positively enhancing the economic market within each state (Henig, 1989).
The literature reveals that proponents of privatization suggest efficiency, improved
service quality, and innovation as primary reasons for states transitioning to privatization (Hubel,
Schreier, Hansen, & Wilcox, 2013; Flaherty, Collins-Camargo, & Lee, 2008). However, in
considering reasons in which states decide to transition to privatization, the implications of
federal policies not being adhered to also play a role in a state’s decision to transition to
privatization (Hornby & Zeller, 2015).
Between the AACWA and ASFA, the AACWA has had the greatest impact on the public
child welfare system. In 1980, AACWA was established as the first federal piece of legislation
that highly impacted the functioning of the public child welfare system (Steen & Smith, 2012;
Collins-Camargo, McBeath, & Ensign, 2011; Gainsborough, 2010; Steen & Duran, 2010;
Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003; Pecora et al., 2000). The AACWA’s primary purpose was to
establish an adoption assistance program, strengthen the foster care assistance program, and
refocus the public child welfare system (Pecora et al., 2000).
This federal policy impacted the public child welfare system by its establishment of
criteria that states were required to adhere to for the reimbursement of funds (Pecora et al., 2000;
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Adoptive Assistance and Child Welfare Act, 1980). When the criteria established by AACWA
identified the states’ responsibility to demonstrate “reasonable efforts” (Adoptive Assistance and
Child Welfare Act of 1980) in the prevention of children entering into the foster care system, this
propelled prompting of the development of family preservation agencies in mass quantities
(Steen & Smith, 2012; Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003; Adoptive Assistance and Child Welfare
Act, 1980). AACWA also required that court systems review cases every 6 months, provided
adoption financial assistance, continued funding with foster care assistance, and continued
enhancement of child welfare system (Adoptive Assistance and Child Welfare Act, 1980). The
federal policy was also the first policy to discern the difference in the needs of children with
special needs within the provided reimbursement for adoption finalizations ($4000 per
child/$6000 for child with special needs) (Adoptive Assistance and Child Welfare Act, 1980).
Later, the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA) (U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, 1997) was signed as a federal policy and was implemented to tighten the
aspects of AACWA (U.S. Department of Human & Health Services, 1997). ASFA provided
more stringent requirements for states and determined that the foster care system was responsible
for the “safety of the child”, which was added to each child’s individual case plan, solidified the
requirements for “reasonable efforts” and made specifications regarding it, continued the funding
for adoption assistance, transferred funds from Title IV-A to Title IV-B specifically for family
preservation and established Title IV-E funding for out of home care and adoption (foster care)
(Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003; Meezan & McBeath, 2003; Pecora et al., 2000).

ASFA also

provided stricter regulations for states regarding meeting state outcomes, specified how states
were required to make “reasonable efforts” provided within AACWA, emphasized the “safety of
the child” and required that all court plans and case plans included aspects related to maintaining
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the safety of the child, and determined that those states being reimbursed were responsible for
providing specific data to National Archive on Child Abuse and Neglect (U.S. Department of
Human & Health Services, 1997).
Subsequent to AACWA and ASFA were enacted, public child welfare systems adjusted
their functioning in an effort to meet the established outcome requirements. Consequently, after
the passage of the ASFA, states were prompted to develop new ways of achieving outcome
requirements, with privatization being one of the primary mechanisms (Steen & Duran, 2010;
Myslewicz, 2007) used to meet the stringent requirements of the federal government (Steen &
Smith, 2012; Humphrey, Turnball, & Turnball, 2004; Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003). As state
governments make the determination to transition state foster care systems into structures
utilizing performance-based contracting as a primary service provider mechanism, the
implications of major federal policy developments and implementation of those policies
regarding the foster care system must be considered.
Financing Public Child Welfare
Most of the states within the United States depend largely on public-assistance funds
which are primarily funded by taxation at various levels of government (Chambers & Wedel,
2009). Under the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (PL 105-89) (ASFA), funding for the
public child welfare system is provided through block grant funds by Title IV-B and Title IV-E
of the Social Security Act (Pecora et al., 2000; Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997). Block
grants are matched grants that extend the capacity of the federal government (Barusch, 2002).
For example, in foster care, states elect to participate in the foster care program and receive
federal funding to provide services to children in need of care. The services that are provided
must adhere to federal guidelines; thus extending the role of the federal government (Barusch,
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2002). Funds are considered to be “matched” as a result of the state being required to pay a
portion of the costs for the foster care system. Typically, block grants are authorized for a
predetermined amount of time (five or ten years) and are provided with specified sets of
guidelines related to how the programs should be operated (Chambers & Wedel, 2009). State
grant funds through Title IV-B and Title IV-E of the Social Security Act are a 70/30 match
(Barusch, 2002); thus, the federal government is responsible for 70% of the cost of care for the
foster care system, while the state is responsible for 30% of the costs of care for children.
Child Welfare Privatization as a Practice Strategy
Recently, privatization of child welfare foster care services has influenced the public and
private agencies that provide services to children and families in the child welfare system. As a
result of the agencies contracting with the state government for funding (Mosely & Ros, 2011),
there has been an increase in non-profit agencies providing child welfare services. By using
nonprofit organizations for service provision, privatization has been viewed as a mechanism for
the government to not only provides cost effective services, but to do so without completely
monopolizing the field of child welfare (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003); thus, decreasing
government dominance of service provision within the public child welfare arena.
A privatized practice model utilizes social contracts between the government and private
providers, and transforms expectations from the state system providing direct services to the state
system engaging in purchase of service contracting with no direct provision of services by the
state within the child welfare continuum of care. Through using POS contracts with private
agencies, the government alters and reshapes its social contract with society by utilizing a
restructuring process in which a private organization acts on behalf of the state to provide
federally mandated services. The provision of these services is grounded in possible
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misconceptions of stronger effectiveness and efficiency strategies of service provision, based on
the contract decisions with the state government maintaining an overseer position and evaluator,
rather than a purveyor of services. This is of course with the belief that children will be better
served at less cost for the state.
As previously mentioned, the three areas of child welfare practice within the public child
welfare system include: investigations and family preservation, foster care, and adoption.
Though the stated primary reason for privatizing state foster care systems is to increase levels of
efficiency, there may be other reasons for transitioning the functions of the system. In Florida,
privatization transpired as a result of a foster care scandal that brought forth the inefficiencies of
the system (Gainsborough, 2010), as well as the necessity for more stringent procedures for child
welfare workers. Kansas can be viewed as another example, where the decision to privatize was
championed as a mechanism to assist in the adherence to guidelines of a consent decree—an
agreement or settlement between two parties without admission of guilt (Sheila A. v. Whiteman,
1993). In 1993, a lawsuit was filed against the state of Kansas (Sheila A. v. Whiteman, 1993) in
which the state’s systemic disorganization, difficulty locating children, and inability to determine
the amount of foster home placements, led to the implementation of privatization (Snell, 2000).
These examples provide a lens to understand that the privatization of a child welfare system
includes decisions based not only on the structure of the system, but also on the complex nature
of systemic functioning.
Components of Privatizing the Foster Care System
There are a variety of ways in which to implement a privatization strategy in the public child
welfare system. However, each strategy of privatization is inclusive of certain primary
components that include the following characteristics: contracting services out to private
agencies (Ram, 2012; Myslewicz, 2007; Morgan & England, 1988), management of the
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competitive market (Ram, 2012; Loson, 2009; Myslewicz, 2007; Zullo, 2006), and development
of a private infrastructure (Myslewicz, 2007; Craig et al., 1998); all utilized to ensure higher
levels of efficiency and effectiveness of service provisions.
From a privatization perspective, contracting services out to private agencies refers to the
transfer of management of governmental services to the private sector, promotion of competition
in the marketplace, and reduction of dependency on government (Ram, 2012; Myslewicz, 2007;
McConnell, Burwick, & Perez-Johnson, 2003; Morgan & England, 1988). The state government
then establishes the rules for a competitive market through contract bidding in which social
service agencies bid for the option to provide services for foster care, adoption, and/or family
preservation. The underlying economic belief is that through the bidding process, state
governments can get private organizations to provide services for increasingly competitive
prices, thereby allowing for higher levels of systemic effectiveness (Hubel, Schreier, Hansen. &
Wilcox, 2013; Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003). This perspective is grounded in a belief that
private agencies have the ability to provide better services, due their organizational structure, as
well as the organizational ability to provide more training for workers (Freundlich &
Gerstenzang, 2003).
Management of the competitive market refers to the public and private service providers
participating in a bidding process for services. Public agencies are established thorough a local,
a state or federal system with the purpose of that agency contained in legal statutes (O’Connor &
Netting, 2009). These agencies are created through legislation and charged with implementing
social policies, thus agency identities are embedded in current and past political ideology as a
result of controversies surrounding social policies and mandating programs and services
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(O’Connor & Netting, 2009). Private agencies are a broad category of organizations that include
nonprofits and for-profits (O’Connor & Netting, 2009).
Ultimately, the results of the competition are meant to infer better management due to the
evaluation of costs, benefits, and accountability (Hubel, Schreier, Hansen, & Wilcox, 2013;
Ram, 2012; Loson, 2009; Myslewicz, 2007; Zullo, 2006). There is a competitive bidding process
in which providers bid on public services that their agency is equipped to provide. The bidding
process is also symbolic of a mechanism utilized to increase systemic efficiency. This is evident
within the application of specified pay scales for provision of services that includes flexibility
within the payment structure decided upon by contractors and the state (Casey Family Programs,
2010; Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003). Each agency is required to submit a response to a
Request for Proposal (RFP) in order to bid on contracts, with each bid containing the fee per
client that the agency will serve (Blackstone et. al, 2004; Unruh & Hodgkin, 2004). The state has
separate contracts for each area of public child welfare: foster care, adoption, and family
preservation (Unruh & Hodgkin, 2004). Development of private infrastructures refers to private
entities being developed in order to build, fund, and operate public infrastructures. These
infrastructures are also developed in order to charge fees, performance based incentives,
increased accountability measures (Myslewicz, 2007; Craig et al., 1998). Thus, the long-term
goal of privatization is to develop a stable public child welfare services system that will enhance
government economic strength, while also reforming a disorganized foster care system.
The earliest states to adopt privatization – thirteen states in total – began the process with
either individual or multiple aspects of the public child welfare system (United States General
Accounting Office, 1998a). Those states had a variety of decisions to make regarding which
form of privatization to utilize, as well as which aspects of public child welfare that they wanted
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to privatize. The challenges that states faced included how to maintain a consistent maintenance
of the cash flow that funded prospective providers, while transitioning to receiving retroactive
reimbursement from Title IV-E, implementation of performance outcomes, as well as how to
transition agency staff and service providers (United States General Accounting Office,1998a).
These challenges and other issues were the reasons that caused state administrations to either
fully support or be adamantly opposed to privatization of public child welfare.
The last component in the privatization process that is typically addressed is the monitoring
and oversight of delivery of services within the privatization realm. Monitoring and oversight
are essential throughout the process of privatization, as they are a means to evaluate the service
provider’s compliance within the privatization agreement, and to ensure systemic effectiveness
and efficiency. Monitoring and oversight are also intended to ensure that private organizations
are meeting federal and state outcomes within a specified budget, as well as to support continued
service provision effectiveness (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003). Important aspects of the state
government’s position as an authority includes sustaining the capacity to oversee contractor
performance, developing evaluative criteria to determine the efficiency of privatized services,
and maintaining a quality control system to ensure providers are complying with their
contractual agreements (United States General Accounting Office, 1998b).
Ideally, privatization was first viewed as a mechanism to promote a partnership between
public and private sectors in the service provision arena within child welfare system (Gibelman,
1998). As a concept, privatization also offered the potential to assist state-run foster care
systems that may have appeared unsuccessful at ensuring the safety of children and providing
appropriate services to families (Lewandowski & GlenMaye, 2002). Driven by federal court
orders, state legislation, and consent decrees, states may be prompted to utilize privatization as a
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mechanism to transition inefficient foster care systems into more effective systems, often
modeled after the managed care method used within healthcare (Westat & Chapin Hall Center
for Children, 2002).
Theory and the Privatization of Foster Care
Given that the foster care system is one system within a larger hierarchical macrosystem
of public child welfare services, with the federal government as the primary determining system,
the underlying bureaucratic rational approach of the system in its entirety supports the
conceptualization of privatization. Perhaps the best way to explain the theoretical grounding of
foster care and its structure, along with the theoretical movement towards privatization is to
envision the system as a multitude of entities that includes of children, families, organizations,
and policies bounded by a governmental bureaucracy.
State foster care systems are complex. Each state varies in systemic functioning, design,
and delivery of foster care services (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003). Consequently, while this
study is interested in state level differences between privatized, partially privatized, and nonprivatized foster care systems, there is recognition that the impact of privatization system also
occurs at the individual and family level. In an effort to capture knowledge regarding the
different state systems, as well as its impact on children and families, theoretical guidance will
be provided through a combination of related theories that will allow an emphasis on each
system of interest.
General Systems Theory
Many influential scholars have contributed to the development of general systems theory
(GST). Von Bertalanffy (1950) developed the systems perspective from “organismic biology”
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(Von Bertalanffy, 1950, p. 135) in which he identified that organisms were a part of “systems”
(p. 138) and each organism functioned as a mechanism within those systems (Von Bertalanffy,
1950). In 1958, Hearn identified that other aspects of the world could be a system as well
including planets, space, the universe, and the environment (Hearn, 1958). Later, Hearn (1969)
argued that individuals, groups, communities, and organizations could be classified as systems as
well. Goldstein (1973) transitioned general systems theory to a “social science theory” (p. 110)
by applying the theory to human beings and declaring that human beings were also systems.
Social science theory then transitioned the theory to having an emphasis on human interaction
with the elements of the environment, characteristics of those elements, the interrelatedness of
the elements, and how those elements impacted the individual (Goldstein, 1973). As a result, the
theoretical assumptions worked as hypotheses for explaining, predicting, and controlling
phenomena (Greene & Frankel, 2005).
Within the context of the public child welfare system, the foster care system can be
viewed within a hierarchical large scale system that is inclusive of smaller subsystems, such as
policies, organizations, children, and their families (see Figure 2.1). These subsystems function
via mechanisms of input—resources—and the processing or conversion of that input into an
output of the system (Hearn, 1969). Take for instance the role of the employee within the foster
care system (case manager, administrator, supervisor, etc.), which can be viewed as an input of
the foster care system (Steen & Smith, 2012). An example of processing would be viewed as the
case management of cases from the time a child enters care until the child leaves the foster care
system. Here, output may be considered as a child achieving or not achieving permanency. This
systemic procedure is continuous and creates feedback, the ability of a system to reintroduce
output as input (Hearn, 1969). Systems are regulated through a feedback loop inclusive of a
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relationship between positive feedback—any feedback that leads to change— (Hearn, 1995) and
negative feedback—any feedback that leads to no change— (Hanson, 1995). This means that
any action or inaction leads to unpredictable effects including the delivery of the inverse of the
intended effect reverberate through the entire system. Example of positive and negative
feedback in foster care can be when a state is seen to be in non-compliance with federal
legislation (i.e., positive feedback). In that instance, states may choose to attend court and alter
the concerns with compliance, or enter into a consent decree in which no admission of error
occurs (i.e., negative feedback). Despite either action the state takes, the action or inaction can
lead to unpredictable effects for the entire system.
The primary tenets of GST are that all systems—any two or more parts that are related in
such a way that change in any one part change all parts— (Hanson, 1995), have a level of
interaction with other systems. Thus, in understanding the interaction of the parts, one attains the
ability to determine and explain the functionality of systems. In essence, any action or inaction
that reverberates through the entire system leads to unpredictable effects including effects that
deliver the inverse of the intended effect which have implications for the system as a whole
(Hanson, 1995). As a result, an alteration in systemic operating, such as a transition to
privatization, will not only impact the macrosystem (the public child welfare system) but the
individuals and families served by the macrosystem as well.
Given that the ultimate goal of the foster care system is to ensure the safety of the child
and ultimately provide safe permanency options, effectiveness and efficiency of the foster care
system should denote systemic equilibrium, the stability of the system (Goldstein, 1973). In
using GST to understand the functioning of the foster care system, variables such as a child’s
total number of removals from the familial home, the total number of placement settings in foster
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care custody, as well as the length of days since the latest removal date can be considered forms
of measuring efficiency. Thus, achieving systemic equilibrium translates to efficiency by driving
down the costs of care, while still promoting responsiveness to clients’ needs within the

Figure 2.1 Foster Care Hierarchical Macrosystem
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achievement of outcomes. For effectiveness, the theory can be used when assessing the length of
days within a previous foster care stay, the total number of days a child stays in foster care
custody, the number of placement settings during a child’s current foster care stay, the number of
children aging out of the system, and the age of the child once they exit foster care. As a result,
equilibrium represented by effectiveness is demonstrated by stability in the experience of the
child within relation to their foster care stay.
Skyttner (2001), based on the premise of Von Bertalanffy’s perspective, proposes that
unrelated and independent elements can never constitute a system; therefore systems are always
comprised of the interrelationship and interdependence of objects. As a result, children, families,
organizations, and policies can be understood as separate systems in the foster care system that
are intertwined in a transformative and cyclical process that contributes to either the entropy –
amount of disorganization within the foster care system—or regulation—interrelated objects that
must be regulated in an effort to attain the overall goals of a system (Skyttner, 2001). In other
words, all aspects of the foster care system are interconnected and relational in ways that impact
the system equilibrium, entropy, and regulation. Consequently, entropy and regulation can be
assessed by measuring efficiency and effectiveness as indicators of systemic equilibrium.
Thus, to fully encapsulate the primary purpose of the outcome driven foster care system,
an assessment of the many parts of the system is necessary. In congruence with the concept that
“the whole greater than the sum of its parts” (Andreae, 2005, p. 244), utilization of GST as a
theoretical foundation within examination of the foster care system provides a framework to
understand how the many different systemic interactions interface with one another. For
example, to understand the efficiency and effectiveness of the system, the total number of
removals for a child, as well as the length of time the child has been in care, would be important
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to know. The two variables provide the ability to comprehend how efficiency and effectiveness,
together, can demonstrate how the interaction between systemic functions form connections with
one another, while also contributing to knowledge related to the experience of the child.
GST is a comprehensive theory that can be used to guide the analysis of the interaction
and relational qualities between and amongst components of a system (Greene & Frankel, 2005).
GST provides a mechanism to describe the interconnectedness of systems which include
individuals, groups, organizations, etc., which are systems that comprise the foster care system.
The theory provides a multi-causal context for understanding human behavior; emphasizes
interdependence and interactions amongst people; and considers the many systems that people
interact with (Greene & Frankel, 2005). Within this study, for example, comprehension of the
experience of children of color in foster care within the context of efficiency (e.g., length of time
in care) and effectiveness (e.g. exited to emancipation) is demonstrative of the impact of
systemic interaction and its implications for children in care.
Each of the systems has the capacity to interact with different systems in one way or
another that contribute to closed systems which move toward a state of maximum disorganization
to attain equilibrium (Hanson, 1995). Conversely, the systems can partake in the transformation
process and contribute to an open system— systems that are organized (Hearn, 1968)in which
forces at play work to create and destroy order; thereby enabling the process of developing order
or organization within a system (Hanson, 1995). For example, given that the federal government
provides states with funding and specific mandates to run a foster care system, it can be
considered a macrosystem, despite the fact that it does not mandate how the system is designed
so that each state foster care system functions differently (Pecora et al., 2000). Some states
choose to function under the strict guidance of the state government and those systems can be
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considered closed systems— systems that are disorganized or in the process of disorganization
(Hearn, 1968). This is primarily a result of the chaotic nature of functioning that state systems
have, as a result of a lack of order within the realm of the complexity of foster care services.
Those systems that utilize performance-based contracting (PBC) (Myslewicz, 2007) as a
privatization mechanism can be viewed as an open system. Although there is not a definitive
form or type of privatization (Steen & Smith, 2012; Casey Family Programs, 2010; Zullo, 2006;
Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003; Henig, 1989), PBC is a primary mechanism in which states
contract out foster care services to contractors who place monetary bids on those services
(Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003), theoretically, creating order within system complexity.
GST can be utilized to comprehend policies and procedures within a foster care system as
well. Positive feedback— any change that occurs within a system— can be demonstrative of the
development of polices and the application of those policies in foster care practice. This is
evident as a result of the change that occurs within the foster care system when policies are
developed or enacted. Conversely, negative feedback— the result of no change within a
system— (Hearn, 1969) can be seen when foster care systems or organizations do not alter
policies to reflect systemic or societal changes (stagnant policies). For instance, if an
organization does not alter employee caseload policies to reflect an increase in the number of
children placed within the foster care system, then children run the risk of not being provided
sufficient services. Thus, representing a lack of response to feedback in order to create needed
change to avoid entropy.
The foster care system is also based on the basic federal mandate that requires a
mechanism to achieve permanency. Equifinality—the result of multiple actions within a system
leading to one result—(Hearn, 1969) is a component of GTS that can be demonstrated from the
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position that children will ultimately achieve permanency as a result of the multiple avenues that
case management services provide. On the other hand, multifinality—the result of an action
within a system leading to multiple unintended changes—(Hearn, 1969) can be viewed similarly.
An example of GST multifinality in public child welfare would be the privatization of foster care
and the resulting difficulties of transitioning of services for employees, organizations and
families. As a result, comprehension of the differences between privatized and non-privatized
systems, regarding the dimensions of efficiency and effectiveness, within the framework of GST
allows for a thorough delineation of the complexity of the foster care system and the
effectiveness and efficiency questions guiding this study.
Ecological Systems Theory
Despite the fact that the foster care system maintains levels of complexity related to its
functionality, it is important to also focus on the fact that the system retains guardianship of a
child; thus, children are both experiencing and interacting with the foster care system. To
explore the experience of a child in foster care, ecological systems theory (a theory congruent
with the GST discussed above) can be a useful way of capturing child-specific aspects within the
nested systems of child welfare.
Ecological systems theory (EST) provides the framework to contextualize the experience
of an individual within a variety of systemic interactions where the individual is directly and
indirectly connected. EST is grounded in the assumption of the centrality of the environments
that people experience and the intermixing of these environments, as well as how this contributes
to the overall development of a human being (Bronfenbrenner, 1979). Within EST, environment
is conceptualized as five sets of nested structures with the inner level being considered the
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person and each consecutive level consisting of an environment in which situations that occur
and contributes to the worldview of the person. Grounded within the theory is the belief that
human beings directly experience situations, maintain relationships with people in other settings,
while also indirectly experiencing the influence of the interrelation of other systems that impact
the development of the individual (Bronfenbrenner, 1979). Consequently, a person may not
essentially be connected to a situation in a different system; however, the interrelation with that
system has a direct impact on the individual (Hong, Algood, Chiu, & Lee, 2011; Fulcher &
McGladdery, 2011). So, in this case, a child in care is not directly connecting to the federal
system and it guidelines for performance, nor to the particular state’s interpretation of those
guidelines/mandates; but the child’s experience with his or her social worker and care provider
are directly impacted by all this, thus, directly influencing the child’s experience of foster care.
EST consists of five systems that, collectively, form the ecological environment of a
human being: microsystem, mesosystem, exosystem, macrosystem, and chronosystem
(Bronfenbrenner, 1979). The first level, microsystem, is centered on the direct experience of an
individual and consists of “a pattern of activities, roles, and interpersonal relations experienced”
(Bronfenbrenner, 1979, pg. 22) by a person. Within this system, individuals engage in
interactions in settings that are face-to-face and reality is constructed from the perspective of the
individual. Thus, this environment focuses on where the individual lives and has social
interactions, so the individual is not only observing situations or taking in what is happening—
they are creating and constructing the experiences they are having. A microsystem, within the
context of a child experiencing the overall foster care system based on entering the system
through removal, would be the direct experience of a child and their perspective of what being a
child within the foster care system means for their identity and development as a human being.
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For example, assessing the microsystem of a child within the foster care system, the total number
of removals, removal manner, and removal reason can assist in the comprehension of the
experience of the child within the foster care system; thus, also allowing assessment of the
efficiency and effectiveness of the microsystem within the context of the foster care system.
Consequently, children in care are experiencing being in the foster care system via mechanisms
such as relationships with foster parents, case workers, other children in care, the court system,
and all other portions of the system they interface with (Fulcher & McGladdery, 2011).
However, they are not only experiencing the system as a child in care, but are also being
impacted developmentally by the interactions of the various systems.
The second level in EST, mesosystem, is an extension of the microsystem. This level is
comprised of the interrelationship between two or more settings in which an individual is
actively participating (Bronfenbrenner, 1979). The mesosystem is a level that is also reformed
whenever an individual moves to a new setting, and the mesosystem allows for the individual to
contribute to creating their experiences. These experiences also include interconnections that
may occur via social networks with both formal and informal communication. Consequently,
this level includes interactions between the microsystem and mesosystem. For a child in the
foster care system, this system may aid in the understanding the experience of the child in
relation to foster home placement, interactions with school environments or with other children
within the foster care system that the child interacts with. One of the main tenets of placement
within the foster care system is that children experience multiple foster home, group home,
residential or kinship placements. In accordance with tenets of the mesosystem, each time a
child moves to a new placement, their mesosystem would be reformed (Fulcher & McGladdery,
2011). Thus, a child’s perspective of their experience within the foster care system would be
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altered as well. Within this study, the mesosystem can be assessed by observing the number of
placement settings a child experiences, the length of time a child is in custody, the ethnicity of
the child, as well as the foster care family structure within a child’s placement.
The exosystem is the first system within EST that specifically places emphasis on indirect
actions that impact the development of the individual. A primary component of this system is
that an individual does not have a role in the construction of their experiences, but their
experiences are interacting with the micro and meso levels as well. This system level may
include “one or more settings that do not involve the developing of an individual as active
participant” (Bronfenbrenner, 1979, pg. 25); however, the events that occur still affect the
development of the individual. For example, a child’s placement may be changed, as a result of
the foster parent’s decision to no longer have the child in the home. Due to the limitations of the
data, this study will not be able to identify such incidents that may have indirectly or directly
impacted the child. However, the exosystem can be assessed within the differences between
privatized and non-privatized foster care systems through their rates of efficiency and
effectiveness, because these variables indirectly impact the experience of the child. Within the
experience of a child, this can be viewed in the context of many different situations such as
activities and decisions determined by court officials in relation to the case, or a child’s
involvement with case management services. For example, in determining rates of efficiency for
privatized and non-privatized state systems, within this study, the total number of removals for a
child in care can be demonstrative of the exosystem. This is due to the connection of court
system within the decision to remove a child from care.
Microsystem, mesosystem, and exosystem are similar in that individuals experience the
interaction between these systems in similar ways. However, different cultures of people will
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experience the levels differently. Thus, the levels experienced by a child involved with the foster
care system, would be drastically different from a child not involved with the foster care system.
In other words, the structure and substance of the first three systems may be similar within the
experience of the individuals within the same culture and yet the systems still function in
different ways. Comprehension of the interaction between the micro, meso, and exo systems can
allow for better picture of the experience of a child within the foster care system through the
following interactions: the relationship between the total number of removals, removal manner,
and removal reason (micro); the number of placement settings a child experiences, the length of
time a child is in custody, the ethnicity of the child, as well as the foster care family structure
within a child’s placement (meso); along with rates of efficiency and effectiveness of the system
(exo).
The fourth level within EST, the macrosystem, consists of subsystems that are connected
to the culture as a whole, in addition to the belief systems and ideologies underlying the
subsystem (Bronfenbrenner, 1979). This level of EST is a level in which the individual does not
have the freedom in determining decisions regarding their surroundings or the functioning of
higher systemic levels, all of which may impact their well-being. For example, each state
government provides public child welfare services that includes the following sections: adoption,
CPS, and family preservation. However, each of the states constructs and operates each system
differently. As a result, the relationship and role of organizations within the care of a child in
foster care will be completely different in Kansas than it would be in Florida. The child still
experiences and develops within each state system; however, decisions regarding service
provision are not inclusive of the child’s perspective. Thus, state systems differ in a variety of
capacities which help to perpetuate a specific ecological environment for each state system.
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Within this study, variables such as the total number of removals for a child out of the
home, their number of placements during the foster care episode, length of days of previous
foster care stay, total days within foster care (all episodes), and the length of days since the last
removal date will be used to gain an understanding of how the efficiency and effectiveness of
individual state foster care systems contribute to the foster care macrosystem. Thus, allowing the
study to identify how each of the efficiency and effectiveness variables studied are system
components that contribute to subsystem functionality. This will result in an understanding of
how the subsystem components are connected to the macrosystem. The concept of the
macrosystem in EST differs from GST in that it allows for comprehension of how the
macrosystem and subsystems impact the well-being of the individual. Thus, the impact of
macrosystem on the child in care is acknowledged and can be understood through the efficiency
and effectiveness demonstrated in privatized and non-privatized state systems.
The last system within EST, chronosystem, relates to the cumulative experience of an
individual over their lifetime. These experiences are including environmental events and major
transitions in life. An example to understand this system within the context of the foster care
system can viewed through the perspective of children aging-out of the foster care system. A
child who “ages out”, exit the foster care system without permanency, of the foster care system
typically exits without resources (Pecora et al., 2000). Thus, understanding the relationship
within the length of days of a previous foster care stay, the total days a child is in care, number of
placement settings during their time in care, and if the child exited to emancipation will provide
an understanding of the cumulative experience of a child in care, along with differences in rates
of effectiveness for privatized and non-privatized state foster care systems (see Figure 2.2).
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Figure 2.2 Ecological Environment of a Child in Foster Care
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Efficiency and Effectiveness of Privatization within the Context of the Foster Care System
Efficiency of Privatization within the Context of Foster Care
Those that promote utilizing a model of privatization within the foster care system
ultimately believe that the model is more efficient than governmental agencies providing services
(Hubel, Schreier, Hansen, & Wilcox, 2013; Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003; Paulson, et al.,
2002). Supporters of privatization maintain a perspective that as efficiency increases within the
services provided, quality will increase as well (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003).

Typically,

efficiency is viewed as a mechanism to judge merit, the relationship between systemic input and
output, expenditures and income, or costs and benefit (Stone, 2002). However, within models of
privatization, efficiency is conceptualized as cost-effectiveness with a goal of having positive
market competition that reduces systemic inefficiency (Hubel, Schreier, Hansen, & Wilcox,
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2013; Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003). In foster care, this is primarily viewed through the lens
of permanency. Achieving permanency for a child in as little time in care as possible, with the
least amount of placements, and ensuring that a child does not re-enter care are the primary
mechanisms of determining rates of efficiency for costs (Pecora et al., 2010; Freundlich &
Gerstenzang, 2003) because these categories ensure that costs of care are kept low. This ensures
that there is more impact and less time spent in care, which equals less costs in the view of the
state.
Efficiency within privatization models of foster care is also surrounded by the
establishment of performance based outcomes that are connected to the contract between the
state and the private provider (Garstka, Collins-Camargo, Hall, Neal, & Ensign, 2012).
Efficiency driven outcomes are based in measurable performance mechanisms, often related to
categories connected to the permanency for the child and they are rooted in the standards
enforced by the federal government (Collins-Camargo, 2010). Examples of efficient child
related outcomes such as number of placements per year, length of days in custody, and the total
number of removals from permanency options. These categories are considered examples of
efficiency as a result of the view that less time in care results in cost-savings for the state,
regardless of the costs of monitoring systemic inputs, processes, and outputs. As a result, these
categories are directly tied to efficiency because the economic rationale is the core argument
made for privatization (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003).

Effectiveness of Privatization within the Context of Foster Care
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Despite the seemingly overwhelming popularity of states’ selection and enactment of a
privatized model for the provision of services, there is little literature on the impact of
privatization on the children within the foster care system. Effectiveness in privatization can be
understood as client improvement (Gillespie, 2000). Thus, experiences of a child’s trajectory in
care inclusive of how many times a child is removed from the home, the number of placement
settings a child has during the episode, the length of days a child has had since their previous
foster care stay, and the total number of days a child spends in foster care serve as examples of
how the experience of the child has either improved or not during their time in foster care.
Within the foster care system, that translates to achieved permanency for the child; but should
also include the overall trajectory experience of the child while in care to assure that the child is
not worse off after care.
Ultimately, permanency is a major measure of effectiveness, because without achieved
permanency, children will age-out of the system. Children who age-out of the foster care system
are more prone towards homelessness, continued utilization of social services, and high rates of
not completing their secondary education (Pecora et al., 2000). Thus, if the primary purpose of
the foster care system is to protect the child and to identify permanency options for children
(Pecora et al., 2000) but a child exits the foster care system without a permanency resource, then
ageing out of foster care can be viewed a failure of the system (Blackstone, Buck, & Hakim,
2004; Craig et al., 1998).
Another important factor related to foster care effectiveness is inclusive of
acknowledging the disproportionate rates of children of color being placed within the child
welfare system and foster care in particular. Children of color maintain a disproportionate
representation within state foster care services and are less likely to be adopted; more likely to
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return home and re-enter the foster care system after permanency has been declared (Blackstone,
Buck, & Hakim, 2004; Pecora et al., 2000; Craig et al., 1998). As a result, thorough assessment
of effectiveness of the foster care system should include a focus on children of color and their
rates of achieved permanency (including the type of placement used to declare permanency);
length of time in custody; number of placements while in custody; and whether or not the child
has been in custody prior to current placement to assist assessing the effectiveness of
privatization models.
Perspectives on Privatization of Foster Care
While there are political elements that often appear enthusiastic about the potential of
privatization for state child welfare systems, the enthusiasm for privatizing is not universal. The
following section identifies both the proponent and opponent perspectives in an effort to further
clarify what should constitute measures of efficiency and effectiveness in the move toward a
privatized foster care system.
Proponents of Privatization
Proponents of privatization argue that the system should be run efficiently to attain systemic
outcomes. From a rational bureaucratic perspective, privatization allows for the state to facilitate
management in a large, complex system in order to increase productivity (O’Connor & Netting,
2009; Paulson, et al., 2002). Proponents of privatization argue that the successful functioning of
the foster care system is dependent upon ensuring that goals are specified and then efficient
service technologies are utilized to meet those goals (Hasenfield, 2000). For example, in foster
care, privatization allows for specific outcome development and measurement, and employs case
management to ensure that those outcomes are met. This results in better management of the
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system and provides a quick response mechanism to penalize poor performance through
monitoring and case management (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003). The conceptualization of
these technologies include the underlying belief that privatization provides cost effectiveness of
services, quality service provision based on the required development of measurable
performance outcomes (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003; Department of Health and Human
Services, 2002). Thus insuring cost effectiveness regarding personnel costs, as a result of states
not being responsible for payment structure for employees or their benefits. As a result,
privatization can also be viewed as a cost-shifting mechanism of the state from the state being
responsible for employees, to the private agency maintaining the sole responsibility of the
employee delivering the state’s mandated services.
Proponents of a privatization model argue that privatization is also cost-effective because
it allows autonomy of workers within their ability to advocate for organizational and client
policies for children in foster care, permits innovative service delivery techniques, higher quality
of services at lower costs, and provides for increased systemic data collection for measuring
efficiency of services (Casey Family Programs, 2010; Myslewicz, 2007; Freundlich &
Gerstenzang, 2003; McConnell, Burwick, & Perez-Johnson, 2003; Paulson, et al., 2002).
Supporters of privatization also argue that privatized states support the necessity of
licensure and training for workers, along with the addition of educational requirements for
different levels of social work practice (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003) as contracted
organizations are responsible for more stringent requirements for foster care workers.
According to proponents, these additional requirements will improve the quality of direct
services.
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Privatization also provides a specified time for provision and production of services;
accountability for pre-determined outcomes including aspects of overseeing by the government;
specified pay scale for provision of services that is flexible (e.g., capitated, capped allocation, or
case rate); as well as allowing for contractors and the state to decide payment structure (Casey
Family Programs, 2010; Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003). All this establishes the contractor
flexibility to determine how contractors are paid for services, while also promoting competition
within the marketplace.
Other supportive arguments for privatization of foster care include continuity of care of
clients because the same case management team (not necessarily the same workers) provides
services for child for the duration of care (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003; Department of
Health and Human Services, 2002). Though there is no guarantee that the same worker will be
involved for the duration, the argument is that case management turn-over is lessened as result of
the support and salaries of employees within a privatized agency (Freundlich & Gerstenzang,
2003). Privatization also provides the worker with the ability to utilize innovative approaches to
delivering services; allows for the advocacy of policies by workers; and is inclusive of state data
collection (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003).
Another political reason for supporting privatization has to do with the transfer of services
from public entities to the private sector. One of the primary reasons for supporting privatization
of public child welfare is the limited involvement of the federal government within the state’s
position in foster care (United States General Accounting Office, 1998a). The Administration
for Children and Families (ACF), which is part of the Department of Health and Human
Services, administers the federal components of care to public child welfare programs (United
States General Accounting Office, 1998a). These federal components are inclusive of federal
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requirements related to monitoring the state’s compliance with federal statutes and regulations,
maintaining numerous research centers throughout the country, and continual support of research
and evaluative means related to public child welfare in all states (United States General
Accounting Office, 1998a). Privatization lessens the federal direct involvement in services
because the contractual arrangements act as a state sanctioned mediator. From this perspective,
having a privatized system promotes the idea that a locally determined service delivery will be
more attentive to the needs of local children; thereby being more effective as well. Privatization
is seen to protect state’s rights.
Proponents of privatization express the assumption that the increased competition that occurs
between service providers who compete for contracts results in cost savings due to competition
(Morgan & England, 1988). In other words, there will be less cost per unit based on competition
for the cheapest service at the best level of effectiveness. The thinking is that the private sector
has a stronger sense of responsibility to provide efficient services; while the public sector by its
nature will increase bureaucratic “red tape” and contribute a decrease in efficient service
delivery. In other words in this argument, the private sector has the capacity to have an equal
emphasis on efficiency and effectiveness; whereas the public sector maintains an emphasis on
efficiency, with the assumption that more efficient services contribute to effectiveness. Despite
this perspective, early research suggests that privatization does not save the state government
money (Carey, 2008). At this point, the states choosing privatization are doing so to achieve a
reduction in costs; increased efficiency of service operations; improvements within the delivery
of services; and a reduction in governmental bureaucracy (Goodrich, 1988) none of which has
been measured.
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Ultimately, the proponents of privatization infer that implementation of privatization fosters
accountability in the provision of services and a competitive bidding market for services
providers (Freundlich &Gerstenzang, 2003; Paulson, et al., 2002). Where privatization is
occurring, state governments have decided that a competitive market will encourage service
providers to bid on services they wished to provide which would contribute to the improvement
of state outcomes and reduce the cost of care to state government (Snell, 2000). From the
proponent position, privatization of public child welfare services demonstrates a fit related to the
goal of organization of services; implementation of policies to enhance services provided; and
provisions to monitor public child welfare (placement of children in foster homes, foster care
costs, professionalization of social workers, etc.) (Snell, 2000), even without empirical evidence
to support this position.
Overall, within the context of foster care, the proponents of privatization maintain that the
ultimate purpose of a privatized system is to focus on the lack of permanency for children;
control the high number of placements for children; lower caseloads for social workers; and to
decrease turnover of social workers (Snell, 2000). This is all meant to ensure that permanency
and safety of the child is increased. However, in the end, privatization is often implemented as a
means to develop efficiency within the services provided in the public child welfare system
(Roin, 2011; Ram, 2010; Steen & Duran, 2010).The rhetoric is that privatization is a way to
provide better services such that permanency is assured and child safety is increased. But with
this comes a potential confounding of efficiency and effectiveness such that less cost becomes a
measure of effectiveness, which is of great concern in this project.

Opponents of Privatization
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In searching the literature for opponents of privatization, it appeared that there has been a
valiant effort to justify the process of privatization. More than likely this has occurred so that
ideologically and conceptually, those who transition to privatization have support to justify
utilizing models of privatization. However, opponents of privatization of the public child
welfare system base their position on a variety of factors. First of all, opponents in evaluating
states’ decision to privatize, suggest that the priority for the state was its concern with outcomes;
not services provided (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003). States often do not complete any prior
research related to how privatization would affect the children and families in the foster care
system, the employees working for the state, or the agencies that were bidding on services
(Loson, 2009; Zullo, 2006).
Critics also argue that privatization represents the decentralization of government that does
nothing about the reason why services provided are not a higher quality (Paulson et al., 2002).
The shift does not address social service programs’ underfunding as a primary reason for service
quality challenges. In fact, the bidding process for PBC may be lower in the early stages of
privatization; however, over time contractors are seen to increase their bids, thus, demonstrating
needed increases to assure quality services (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003; Myslewicz, 2003).
Opponents of privatization propose that the delivery of public services should not be
intermixed with the private market because of the implications for families. Often times, public
child welfare services are provided on an involuntary basis and clients are typically unwilling to
be available for supportive of services, due to their child being removed from their care (United
States General Accounting Office, 1998a). Consequently, families are more apprehensive to
systematic interventions or interaction with individuals that represent the public child welfare
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system, which now is represented by the private sector uninvolved in important aspects of
mandated services to unwilling or involuntary clients.
The competitive nature of privatization process also poses potential problems for exploitation
of the market (Carey, 2008). State authorities opt to utilize providers due to a lower bid, as
opposed to selecting providers that deliver the best services. In other words, privatization of
public child welfare services has the potential of prohibiting families from receiving adequate
services (Humphrey, Turnball, & Turnball, 2006).
Another factor that contributes to the difficulty of applying a privatization model to public
child welfare services is that public agencies typically emphasize the overall well-being of a
child’s needs, inclusive of safety, protection, social supports and mental health needs; therefore,
diagnosis, interventions, and outcomes are more forthcoming than in the managed care health
care model that privatization of public child welfare is based on (United States General
Accounting Office, 1998a). Privatization affects all foster care services provided and has been
shown to have negative implications for mental health and aftercare services early in the
privatization transition process (Collins-Camargo, McBeath, & Ensign, 2011). Due to the
necessity of providing outcome based services, practitioners are often positioned to adhere to
streamlined procedures and protocols that contribute to the deskilling of practitioners (Carey,
2008). In other words, there is less emphasis on skilled practitioners to critically think and
provide services based on their professional skill and more on an emphasis in ensuring that the
practitioner is focused on attaining outcomes at all costs.
In most models of privatization states provide time-based incentives to contractors, this
suggests the possibility of children being improperly accelerated through the foster care system
to achieve the incentives (Zullo, 2006). This perspective alludes to the belief that privatization
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blurs the line between public and private services, thus contributing to inefficiency of services
(Morgan & England, 1988). Thus, instead of having clear lines of demarcation, privatization
allows for areas that may have a lack of clarity in service provision.
Another aspect of concern is the impact on the careers of public employees, as well as the
potential for agencies to incur bankruptcies, fraud, and corruption as a result of their experiences
with PBC (Morgan & England, 1988) and services provided. For example in Kansas, the
complexity of the multidimensional link between the contractor and the state created unrealistic
fiscal methods (Martin, 2005) that catapulted the contractor agency into bankruptcy (Freundlich
& Gerzstenzeng, 2003).
Another position opponents maintain is that the public child welfare system does not function
have an individual entity, due to its connection with the court system. Courts maintain a
consistent and key position within the realm of foster care, as a result of the foster care system
being placed under the jurisdiction of the state’s authority (United States General Accounting
Office, 1998a). Each state determines the full extent of the courts authority; however, courts
typically maintain ultimate decision power regarding the foster care process; thus, providing a
limitation for service providers (Humphrey, Turnball, & Turnball, 2006).
Other concerns for privatization include the implications of the state transition process to
privatization. Given that organizational culture and climate are impacted by organizational
change (Collins-Camargo, Ellet, & Lester, 2012) transition periods to privatization have been
found problematic for organizational structure and practice. This has implications for
organizational culture and climate, as a result of its connection to organizational effectiveness
(Collins-Camargo, Ellet, & Lester, 2012; Glisson & Green, 2010) in areas such as the
relationships between service providers and clients which impact the quality of services provided
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to clients. Transitions to privatization have large effect on organizational practice (Freundlich &
Gerstenzang, 2003) and it does not often occur in ways that assure that organizational change is
appropriately managed in ways that prevent negative financial and emotional consequences for
all involved in service delivery; which has important impacts on the children being served.
Essentially, critics of privatization argue that the model provides ways to increase inequity
within a system, (Hansenfield & Garrow, 2012) that is already filled with inequalities. Examples
of these inequities include the inability of clients to truly choose who they receive services from,
as a result of their involuntary involvement with services, as well as the limited capacity of the
government supervising the contracts to truly hold private agencies accountable for service
provision (Hansenfield & Garrow, 2012). These inequities are a result of the system not being
held responsible for the provision of higher quality services as a result of social services
continued underfunding, the problematic nature of contract bidding (Freundlich & Gerstenzang,
2003) and the potential to contribute to monopolization of service provision by provider
organizations.
In sum, the overall critique of privatization of public child welfare is that the process
promotes systemic utilization of an economic model for human behavior, yet the model fails to
identify with the complexity of social times, forms of cooperation, and achieving
interdependence between individuals within the system and those within the organizations that
provide the services.
Focus of the Study
The review of the literature indicates that there is a need for deeper understanding of
privatization in child welfare—particularly in foster care services—due to the almost total
absence of empirically based information regarding costs and consequences of this change in the
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social contract regarding public child welfare. In obtaining data regarding the impact of
privatization, the results could provide important information that could serve to truly alter
systemic functioning for the betterment of service delivery for the child. This dissertation
provides an understanding of the intended and unintended consequences of policy for social
work practitioners and clients served and knowledge regarding the potentially dialectal
interaction between policies (Quadagno, 1996). This knowledge, over time, has the potential to
increase the integration of policy, practice, and organizational functioning that prevents further
victimization of children and youth within the foster care system.
As a result of the sparse literature regarding the experience of the child within a privatized
foster care system (or any system for that matter), this dissertation addresses how privatization
affects the factors that contribute to the experience of the child within the foster care system, as
well as the efficiency and effectiveness of privatization when compared to non-privatized state
foster care systems. The knowledge gained from this dissertation contributes to an
understanding of ways to prevent adverse conditions that may be present within privatized foster
care systems. Its additional aims included being able to infer the impact of privatization on
children aging out of the foster care system and on the prevention of the re-victimization of a
child while they are the responsibility of the public child welfare system. Knowledge regarding
current service delivery and its efficiency and effectiveness for the child should help to ensure
that state-level foster care systems truly emphasize the best interest of the child.
The policy and practice implications of the proposed research include: the generation of
knowledge regarding the rates of efficiency and effectiveness with state foster care systems that
are privatized as compared to those that are not privatized, as well as a comprehensive focus on
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the experience of the child in foster care that could strengthen the link between child welfare
policy and practice.

Thus, the research questions for this project are:
1. Are there differences between privatized, partially privatized, and non-privatized state
foster care systems?
2. Are there differences in rates of efficiency for privatized and non-privatized state foster
care systems?
3. Are there differences in rates of effectiveness for privatized and non-privatized state
foster care systems?
The next chapter will discuss the research design and methods selected to answer the
research questions that will hopefully move the discussion in the directions desired.
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Chapter Three: Methodology
Research Proposal
The aims of this research project are to 1) contribute to the generation of knowledge
regarding the rates of efficiency and effectiveness with state foster care systems that are
privatized as compared to those that are not privatized, 2) identify any differential impact on the
foster care system between privatized and non-privatized state foster care systems from the
standpoint of the child and 3) develop a comprehensive focus on the experience of the child in
foster care that could strengthen the link between child welfare policy and practice. The
overarching research question for this study is:
1. Are there differences between privatized, partially privatized, and non-privatized state
foster care systems?
The secondary research questions for this study include the following questions:
2.

Are there differences in rates of efficiency for privatized, partially privatized, and nonprivatized state foster care systems?

3. Are there differences in rates of effectiveness for privatized, privatized, and nonprivatized state foster care systems?
Statistical Measures Designed for Privatization
Currently, there are no known standardized measures designed to assess the efficiency
and effectiveness of privatized practice models used within state child welfare systems. Previous
studies that have specifically addressed privatization have utilized qualitative methodological
designs (Steen & Smith, 2012) assessing the attitudes of human services workers towards
privatization as a policy. There has been very little research conducted on privatization of foster
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care and none on the efficiency and the effectiveness of models of privatization that are utilized
by states.
Secondary Data
The overall study design employs, an objectivist, positivistic perspective that employs
quantitative data and natural science methods used to understand the world. The research
approach involves secondary data analysis of the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and
Reporting System (AFCARS), a federally mandated data collection system overseen by the
Children’s Bureau intended to provide case specific information on all children during their
placement in the public child welfare system (United States Department of Health and Human
Services, 2011). Secondary analysis provides the ability to utilize previously collected data in
order to explore additional hypotheses connected to the original dataset (Heaton, 2010).
Secondary data analysis allows exploration of established data sets, addresses methodological
concerns in the collection of data, as well as possible measurement limitations (Secret & PeckHeath, 2004).
Despite data not having been collected with same purposes as the secondary analysis
there are many advantages to using secondary analysis. Often times, secondary data provide the
ability to use large data sets, derived from procedures that obtain high response rates (Rubin &
Babbie, 2013). Large data sets also provide the ability to examine information with a variety of
multivariate statistical techniques, while also having strength related to methodology, size and
representativeness of the sample (Rubin & Babbie, 2013). For this study, utilizing a large data set
allows for the ability to attain an overall view of how the foster care system functions in its
entirety. The ability to use a data system that captures information from all fifty states provides
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the best chance at gaining a foundational view of how privatization is functioning within states
that are using these models, while also providing a lens of how those states compare to states that
are not privatized. Other advantages include increased generalizability, enhanced statistical
power and reduction of sampling error (Heaton, 2010). Dattalo (2010) argues that
generalizability, though the ultimate goal of quantitative research, ultimately requires inferences
and judgments that determine whether or not the differentiations between the original and new
contexts have applicability to the population studied. In this study, generalizability is increased
as a result of including all 50 states within the analysis; thus, increasing the statistical power of
the study and decreasing the chances of statistical error (Dattalo, 2010).
Although there are numerous benefits of utilizing secondary data, there are limitations as
well. The most important limitation of secondary data is that the primary purpose of the data is
not directly tied to the secondary analysis. This enhances problems related to internal validity, as
a result of scenarios such as the initial researchers collecting and defining data in ways that do
not match the variable definitions or usage within the secondary analysis (Rubin & Babbie,
2013). For this study, the initial data collected was not meant to specifically address
privatization. Also, as a result of the limited research related to the definition of efficiency and
effectiveness in foster care; the manner in which the variables are used in this study will deviate
from the original intention of the data collected. Another limitation of secondary analysis is that
existing data determines the nature of the research inquiry, as opposed to a priori theory (Heaton,
2010) driving the research inquiry. When existing data determines the research inquiry, the
study is based on questions that can be derived from the data; as opposed to constructing a
research questions grounded in theory. Even with its limitations, secondary data is often times

69

less costly than collecting original data and the results of analysis can have large impacts on
policy and practice (Price, 2008).
In an effort to examine state-level foster care data for all fifty states within the United
States, pre-existing data was utilized within this study. This allowed for a thorough analysis and
comparison of state foster care systems and the impact of privatization on the functioning of the
system and the children being served.
The Dataset
Overview
The Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) data are
collected annually by The Children’s Bureau and funded by the Administration on Children,
Youth, and Families, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (Adoption and Foster Care
Analysis & Reporting System, 2002; Department of Health and Human Services, 2002). The
data are housed in the National Data Archive on Child Abuse and Neglect (NDACN) at Cornell
University. The AFCARS data have a twofold purpose in that they are meant to address both
policy development and program management at the state and federal levels. The data are the
most comprehensive state level data collected that have a representation of all children within the
foster care system. As a result, the data are child-level data at an aggregate state level, thus the
sample will be categorized at the state-level.
Data Characteristics. Since 1998, states that receive reimbursement from the federal
government for foster care and adoption services are required to provide child-case level data to
the federal government (National Data Archive on Child Abuse and Neglect, 2012; Pecora et al.,
2007). As a federally mandated government collection system, AFCARS provides case specific
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data for each child in custody for the duration of that custody and for any subsequent custody
decisions resulting in placement out of their home. States are required to collect specific case
level data on all children that are in that state’s custody. For foster care, data points relate to
placement, care, and supervision.
States submit the required foster care data electronically to the Children’s Bureau at the
close of two semi-annual reporting periods: October 1 to March 31, and April 1 to September 30
of each year. States submit 66 foster care data elements and the Children’s Bureau combines the
state files from the two periods into a singular database (Adopting and Foster Care Analysis &
Reporting System, 2002). Only one record per foster care child is included within the annual
database, and includes only the most recent record received. Thus, if a child comes into care at
the start of the year, achieves permanency and then later returns during the second half of the
year, the child will have one record for the annual database and it will be the file submitted when
the child entered care a second time, thus, potentially under reporting foster care activities. The
data file utilized for this study was collected from October 1, 2011 through September 30, 2012,
and contains the public child welfare system reports for 50 states, the District of Columbia, and
Puerto Rico (Adopting and Foster Care Analysis & Reporting System, 2002).
Data Sample. To examine the research questions, states were grouped into three groups:
fully privatized, partially privatized, and non-privatized. States were placed in groups based
upon information obtained from their state websites, documents provided on their state websites,
as well as communication from state public child welfare administrators, nonprofit
administrators, and university child welfare researchers with regard to state privatization levels
in the year 2012. As a result, there are instances in which the literature may report a state’s level
of privatization that may not be indicative of the state’s privatization level within this sample.
71

The units of analysis in this research are states. All 50 states and the District of Columbia were
included in this study.
Data Collection Procedures. Every day, states and the U.S. territories collect data related
to the administration of their foster care programs and a subset of the data collected by the state
is required, by law, to be sent to the Children’s Bureau (M. Dineen, personal communication,
September 29, 2014). The data collected are case based data provided by the primary worker,
gathered at the unit and agency level, provided to state and then compiled for submission to the
federal government. The states are not required to reply to specific research questions, but are
required to collect data on each child in care based on federal outcomes (Pecora et al., 2007). As
a result, the data are collected by the states, delivered to the Children’s Bureau and are compiled
electronically (M. Dineen, personal communication, September 29, 2014).
The purpose of the data are to address policy development and program management at
both the state and federal level (Adopting and Foster Care Analysis & Reporting System, 2002).
Reporting periods for AFCARS are connected to the federal fiscal year; thus, there are two data
collection points per year. Data are checked by the Children’s Bureau to ensure the quality and
completeness of the data (M. Dineen, personal communication, September 29, 2014). The first
period extends from October 1 through March 31 and the second is form April 1 to September
30. These two data collection points are combined by The Children’s Bureau into one single
annual database (Adopting and Foster Care Analysis & Reporting System, 2002). In other words,
the foster care file is submitted by the states to the Children's Bureau in two six-month batches
(the two data collection points); called the "A" submission and "B" submission. The files are
then combined into one annual file, retaining the most recent record for each child; resulting in
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one entry per child in the file from each state (M. Dineen, personal communication, August 26,
2014).
Research Design
Eligibility Criteria
All 50 states and one U.S. territory, the District of Columbia (n=51) data were utilized in
this purposive sample; however, groups were not randomly sampled as a result of the nature of
the phenomenon. States were grouped based upon their privatization status: fully privatized,
partially privatized, and non-privatized. To ensure that states were placed in the correct group,
state administrators, foster care managers, child welfare nonprofit administrators, and child
welfare university researchers were contacted via telephone and email to receive recent
information regarding whether or not family preservation, foster care, and adoption sectors were
controlled by the state or contracted out for service provision. It was also discussed whether or
not when services were contracted out, if the state continued to provide case management
services in the areas of family preservation, foster care, and adoption sectors. If the state
continued to provide case management services, that state was considered to be non-privatized.
State public child welfare websites were also researched to identify their level of privatization
via available documents. The language barriers were greater than the capacity of the territory for
Puerto Rico, so the data for the territory had to be dropped from the study.
The total sample consisted of 638,031 cases (n=683, 031), which represent the individual
children in the foster care system. As a result of the information received by public child welfare
personnel, in some cases, sample decision-making regarding what constitutes the grouping a
state was placed in, was different than the literature suggested. The difference may be the
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intervening variable of time that has passed since the literature was published, or the precision to
which communication with states occurred in this study to make that determination.
Variables
Dependent Variables
As a result of the nature of this study, the primary emphasis of the analysis are on
privatization, with a specific focus on the categories of fully privatized, partially privatized, and
non-privatized. Thus, the dependent variables for the study are the categories privatized and nonprivatized. Dependent upon specific research questions, variables are examined by the three
categories as well.
Fully privatized. This variable is inclusive of states that have each of their sections of
public child welfare system: family preservation, foster care, and adoption privatized. States
within this group do not provide direct case management services; thus, the private organizations
provide all services related to the public child welfare system, exclusive of investigative services
(see Table 3.1).
Partially privatized. For this variable, states that have one or two of their public child
welfare system privatized are included. States within this group provide direct case management
services in at least one component of public child welfare (i.e. family preservation, foster care, or
adoption); thus, private organizations may provide services related to the public child welfare
system, exclusive of investigative services (see Table 3.1).
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Non-privatized1. If the state does not have any of the sections within the public child
welfare system privatized; the state is included within this category. States provide case
management for all of the sections of public child welfare (i.e. family preservation, foster care,
or adoption); however, the state may also utilize purchase of service contracting for service
provision (see Table 3.1).
Table 3.1
State Privatization Levels
Fully Privatized

Partially Privatized

Non-Privatized

California, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas,
Nebraska, Wisconsin

Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, District
of Columbia, Illinois, Maine,
Michigan, Missouri, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, New
York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, West
Virginia

Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado,
Connecticut, Georgia*, Idaho,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana,
Nevada, New Jersey, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma*,
Oregon, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota*, Tennessee,
Texas*, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington*, Wyoming

*transitioning to next level of privatization or piloting privatization in one sector of public child welfare

Independent Variables
The dataset is inclusive of 66 variables; however, specific variables will be included in
predetermined variables of efficiency, effectiveness, and aging-out.
Efficiency. Assessing rates of efficiency, with regard to states and their levels of
privatization of the foster care system are limited in the literature. Efficiency, in the context of
public child welfare, has been operationalized as the costs of service provision (Pecora et al.,
2010; Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003; Gillespie, 2000). As a result, a composite variable that
1

The literature supports the definition of the three levels of privatization (Freundlich & Gerstenzeng, 2003);
however, after discussing the implementation of privatization with administrators throughout the country, it
became evident that whether or not the state maintained case management services needed to be included in
determining the level of privatization a state utilized.
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includes the following individual variables: the total number of removals, number of placement
settings during the current foster care episode, and length of days since last removal was utilized
to determine rates of efficiency within the varying levels of privatization. The individual
variables within the composite variable are inclusive primary mechanisms relating to
permanency.
Effectiveness. The literature is limited regarding effectiveness of the foster care system.
Effectiveness is operationalized as client improvement (Gillespie, 2000) within this study.
Consequently, the variable that represented effectiveness was a composite variable and inclusive
of the following variables: length of days of previous foster care stay, total number of days in the
current foster care stay (all episodes included), exited to emancipation, and the number of
placement settings during the current foster care episode. These individual variables are
demonstrative of the trajectory experience of the child in care (see Table 3.2).
Analysis Plan
Due to the nature of the study, states were purposively assigned into groups of fully
privatized, partially privatized, or non-privatized groups (see Table 3.1). Given that the sample
is a nationally representative sample of public child welfare systems, the sample can be
generalized to state child welfare systems. The following study included univariate and
multivariate statistical analysis procedures. Univariate analyses were conducted to determine the
age, sex, race/ethnicity of the composition as it relates to the public child welfare system.
Bivariate analyses were conducted to determine differences between privatized, partially
privatized, and non-privatized foster care systems and their rates of efficiency and effectiveness
in categories related to removal manner, removal reason, and children exiting to emancipation.
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The analyses consisted of a discriminant function analysis (DFA). DFA is a statistical
analysis procedure that is often used to distinguish various characteristics among groups
(Dattalo, 1994) from a set of predictors. The primary purpose of a DFA is to determine whether
or not the combination of predictors can reliably predict group membership (Tabachhnick &
Fidell, 2013). Because DFA allows for the dependent variables to be combined to create a
composite dependent variable, there is an emphasis on group differences which decrease group
similarities. This allows for the technique to minimize Type I error, as a result of the ability of
the researcher to identify the difference between the variables using a single technique. Because
a DFA provides a way to differentiate between variables, it is especially useful in determining
the difference between levels of privatization (i.e. full, partial, and non-privatized) and their rates
of efficiency and effectiveness. Given the definitions of efficiency and effectiveness variables,
there were degrees of overlap. DFA provides the ability to analyze the complexity of the
variables and the interrelatedness of the variables simultaneously (Dattalo, 1994). DFA will also
provide the most parsimonious set of predictor variables related to privatization, while also
providing characteristics for varying types of privatization. Therefore, discriminant function
analysis was utilized to explore the link between efficiency, effectiveness, and privatization.
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Table 3.2
Research Question and Variable Matrix
Overarching Research
Question
RQ1: Are there
differences between
privatized, partially
privatized, and nonprivatized state foster
care systems?

Possible Dependent
Variable
Privatized, Partially
Privatized, NonPrivatized

Possible Independent
Variable
Efficiency/
Effectiveness

RQ2: Are there
differences in rates of
efficiency for privatized
and non-privatized state
foster care systems?

Privatized, Partially
Privatized, NonPrivatized

Efficiency

RQ3: Are there
differences in rates of
effectiveness for
privatized and nonprivatized state foster
care systems?

Privatized, Partially
Privatized, NonPrivatized

Effectiveness
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Variable Name
Efficiency: total # of
removals, number of
placement settings during
the current FC episode,
length (days) since latest
removal date
Effectiveness: length
(days) of previous foster
care state, total days in
foster (all episodes),
number of placement
settings during the current
foster care episode
1. Total number of
removals
2. Number of placement
settings during FC
episode
3. Length (days) since
latest removal date
4. Number of children
5. Days in care
1. Length (days) of
previous FC stay
2. Total days stay in FC
(all episodes)
3. Number of placement
settings (current FC
episode)
4. Exited to
emancipation
5. Child is waiting for
adoption
6. Discharge reason
7. Child’s ethnicity
8. Removal manner
9. Removal reason

Conclusion
The overall purpose of this project is to discern between the systemic differences of
privatized, partially privatized, and non-privatized public child welfare systems through the lens
of efficiency and effectiveness. The key expectations of the analysis described within the
chapter includes redefining efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery to be inclusive of the
child’s experience in care; identifying child well-being as a needed measure of systemic foster
care research, and testing the idea that children aging out of the foster care system represents a
failure of the system because permanency not achieved, is the basis of a child’s placement within
the system. Research suggests that the rationale provided for privatization of foster care includes
cost savings and the establishment of measureable performance standards; however, due to the
lack of research on the impact of privatization on the foster care system, there appears to be a
gap within literature. Knowledge regarding systemic functioning, with regard to its efficiency
and effectiveness for the child, is essential to ensuring that state-level foster care systems truly
emphasize the best interest of the child.
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Chapter Four: Results
Introduction
This study focused on identifying differences between state foster care systems that are
privatized, partially privatized, and non-privatized, while also examining rates of efficiency and
effectiveness within the three levels of the foster care system. There is one primary research
question for this study, as well as two derivative questions which are as follows:
1. Are there differences between privatized, partially privatized, and non-privatized state
foster care systems?
2. Are there differences in rates of efficiency for privatized, partially privatized, and nonprivatized state foster care systems?
3. Are there differences in rates of effectiveness for privatized, privatized, and nonprivatized state foster care systems?
Prescreening Data
In an effort to ensure data accuracy, the dataset was prescreened for absence of data
errors, completion of data, absence of multicollinearity, multivariate normality, absence of
outliers, linearity, and homoscedasticity.
Complete Data.

First, the data was prescreened for patterned missingness in the

Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) Version 22 by recoding the data (with all
missing coded as 1 and all other values coded as 0). In a dataset such as this, missing data can be
attributed to states’ inability to provide requested information as a result of systemic disruptions,
or to the censoring of participant information for enhanced client protection (Dattalo, 2013).
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There are three categories of missing data: missing at random (MAR), missing completely at
random (MCAR), and missing not at random (MNAR) (Dattalo, 2013; Tabachnick & Fidell,
2007).
In this study, a bivariate correlation matrix was produced. Because the Pearson’s r values
of the variables were less than .05, no association between missing values and the values of other
variables can be assumed. In other words, the correlation analysis suggested that the data should
be considered missing at random (MAR). MAR means that missing values are not randomly
distributed across all observations; however, the data are missing in more than one subsample
(Dattalo, 2013).
Outliers. Data were screened for absence of outliers with Cook’s distance measure D
(Cook’s D), in order to detect the overall impact of the observations on the estimated regression
coefficient. Outliers are unusual or extreme values that are defined as observations that appear
to be inconsistent with other observations within the data set (Dattalo, 2013). Outliers can occur
for a variety of reasons such as data errors, misreporting, sampling error (Osborne & Overbay,
2004) or incorrect distributional assumptions (Dattalo, 2013). There are three important
characteristics of outliers: leverage, discrepancy, and influence. Leverage identifies those cases
with unusual values on the independent variable. Discrepancy refers to the distance between
predicted and the observed values related to the dependent variable, whereas influence reflects
the product of leverage and discrepancy (Dattalo, 2013).
Cook’s D is often utilized to understand the three-dimensional nature (i.e. leverage,
discrepancy, and influence) of an outlier and its impact on the estimated regression coefficient
(Lorenze, 1987). Within these data, there are no significant problems with outliers. This is
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because the dataset was cleaned by personnel at the National Data Archives (M. Dineen,
personal communication, September 29, 2014), and because many of the variables are
categorical.
Absence of multicollinearity.

Intercorrelation amongst the independent variables (i.e.,

multicollinearity) that was higher than .80 was considered problematic. Common approaches to
identifying multicollinearity include: (1) an inspection of bivariate correlations among
independent variables, (2) calculating tolerance (1-R²), and (3) calculating the variance inflation
factor (the reciprocal of tolerance); however, the rule of thumb is that the variance inflation
factor (VIF) should be greater than 5.0 (Dattalo, 2013). For this study, an inspection of bivariate
correlations was conducted and one pair of Pearson's r values was greater than .80: length (days)
since latest removal date and total days stay in foster care (all episodes). As a result of the high
correlation between these two variables, the variable, length (days) since latest removal date, was
deleted from the study.
Homoscedasticity.

This is the assumption that the variance around a regression line is

the same for all values of the predictor variable (X), this is the more general case of the equality
of variance-covariance matrices assumption tested by Box’s M, which is discussed below
(Dattalo, 2013). When homoscedasticity is violated, the standard of error can be difficult to
estimate and can impact confidence intervals. Homoscedasticity can be evaluated by examining
a plot of standardized predicted values as a function of standardized residual values (Dattalo,
2013). To detect the presence of violations of homoscedasticity, plots of residuals versus
predicted values were examined for evidence that residuals were a function of predicted values.
After assessing a scatterplot, histogram and p-plot, evidence that the data displayed signs of
mild-moderate heteroscedasticity. Heteroscedasticity has the ability to increase Type-I error by
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being overly optimistic about parameters being statistically different from zero, as well as TypeII error be overly pessimistic about parameters being statistically different from zero (Dattalo,
2013). Typically, heteroscedasticity can be modified by: (1) respecifying the model, or
transforming the variables, (2) using robust standard errors to counter the biased standard errors
caused by the heteroscedasticity, or (3) using weighted least squares to minimize the weight of
the sum of squared residuals (Dattalo, 2013).
Results from the screening procedures of the statistical analyses were considered
acceptable or not a major barrier to employing a discriminant function analysis (DFA).
Discriminant Function Analysis
DFA Model Development.

As a result of the number of variables included with the

AFCARS dataset, a power analysis was conducted to estimate minimally acceptable sample size.
The power analysis suggested that the four proposed models would yield a power equal to .080.
In most cases, selection of predictor variables to utilize within the DFA model are determined by
specific steps that include an examination of the literature regarding the research within the
substantive area and research intuition (P. Dattalo, personal communication, October 30, 2013).
For this study, variables for the model were determined based on the mandated outcomes
that state systems are required to report to the federal government. Given the nature of
privatization of foster care systems, research in the area is limited; thus, there have been minimal
sources that have identified empirical results. However, the literature discusses how state foster
care systems function in an effort to attain the outcomes determined by the federal guidelines
each state system has to abide by (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003; Pecora et al., 2000), as well
as how states utilize privatization models as a mechanism to attain more efficient and effective
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acquisition of those outcomes (Flaherty, Collins-Camargo, & Lee, 2008). As a result, variables
in this model are directly connected to the outcome variables determined by the federal
government as a mechanism to measure a state’s performance within the public child welfare
system. Thus, the original list of variables included: state, total number of removals, number of
placement settings, discharge reason, length (days) since the latest removal date, length (days) of
previous foster care stay, total days stay in foster care, and exited to emancipation. The variable
length (days) since latest removal date was removed because it was highly correlated (r= .959)
with another variable, total (days) in care.
Before proceeding with completing the DFA, the dependent (grouping) variable, state,
was recoded into a dummy coded variable with three levels: (1) fully privatized, (2) partially
privatized, and (3) non-privatized. Dummy coding, recategorization of a discrete variable into a
dichotomous variable (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013) is used as a mechanism to limit the
relationships between the recoded variable and other variables.
Reverse coding. Often times, data can be coded in a way that has negative wording, so
high values indicate the opposite meaning when interpreted. In that case, reverse coding can be
utilized to alter the coding of the variable. Reverse coding was conducted for the following
variables: the number of placements (numplep), total number of removals (totalrem), length of
days in previous foster care stay (previousLOS), and the total days in foster care (LifeLOS). The
mathematical rule for reverse-scoring is: reverse score(x) = max(x) +1-x. Where max(x) is the
maximum possible value for x. As a result, higher scores are equal to higher levels of efficiency
or effectiveness. See Table 4.1 for value of x for each variable.
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Table 4.1
Reverse Coding Score for Variables
Variable Name

Maximum Possible Value for x

the number of placements (numplep)

x=100

total number of removals (totalrem)

x=30

length of days in previous foster care stay (previousLOS)

x=7194

the total days in foster care (LifeLOS)

x=7664

Compound Variables. Given the nature of the variables within the dataset, it was
necessary to develop a compound variable for efficiency and effectiveness. Compound variables
provide the ability to combine multiple variables to comprise one variable. This provides the
ability to observe the complexity of the interaction between a compound variable and a single
variable. As a result of not specifically being addressed within the data, a compound variable for
efficiency and a compound variable for effectiveness were developed. For the efficiency variable,
the following variables that were added together to create a compound variable: (1) number of
placement settings (numplep), (2) total days in foster care (LifeLOS) and (3) length days
previous foster care stay (PreviousLOS)] (See Table 4.2). For the effectiveness variable, the
following individual variables were added together: (1) discharge reason (DISREASN), (2), total
number of removals (TOTALREM), (3) exit to emancipation (AgeOut) (See Table 4.3).
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Table 4.2
Creation of Compound Efficiency Variable
Variable Name

Variable Composition

New Compound Variable

number of placement settings
(numplep)

Ratio

Efficiency

total days in foster care (LifeLOS)

Ratio

Efficiency

length days previous foster care stay
(PreviousLOS)

Ratio

Efficiency

Table 4.3
Creation of Compound Effectiveness Variable
Variable Name

Variable Composition

New Compound Variable

discharge reason (DISREASN)

0-Not applicable

Effectiveness

1-Reunified with parent primary
care giver
2-living with relative
3-Adoption
4-Emancipation
5-Guardianship
6-Transfer to another agency
7-Runaway
8-Death of a child
total number of removals
(TOTALREM),

Ratio

Effectiveness

exit to emancipation (AgeOut)

Ratio

Effectiveness

Bivariate Analyses
Bivariate analyses of all predictors were conducted to provide perspective on the nature
of the relationships between all variables. Correlation matrices were developed for a general
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model and each level of privatization that the states represented. The general model included all
demographic variables, individual variables that were used to create the compound variables, as
well as the compound variables themselves. Correlational analysis for the demographic
variables demonstrated the variable total number of removals was statistically significant with all
variables, except length of days of previous stay in foster care and the efficiency compound
variable; which includes the length of days of previous stay variable.
The variable, number of placement settings during the current foster care episode, had a
negative and significant correlation with the following variables: children of African-American
descent (r = -.090, p= .001, n= 635,741), children of American Indian and Alaskan Native
descent (r= -.011, p= .001, n= 635, 741), children of Hispanic descent (r= -.029, p= .001, n= 635,
741), discharge reason (r= -.082, p=.001, n=493, 127), exited to emancipation (r= - .207, p=
.001, n= 635, 741), and effectiveness (r= -.073, p= .001, n=492, 881). These findings are
consistent with literature that suggests that children of color experience higher rates of placement
changes, as well as that children who spend a longer time in care also maintain high rates of
placement changes (see Table 4.4).
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Table 4.4
Pearson r Correlation Coefficients for Race/Ethnicity Variables with Independent Variables-General Model

Variable

Child
Sex

American
Indian/
Alaskan
Native
(race)

Asian
(race

Child of
AfricanAmerican
Descent
(race)

Child of
Hawaiian/Pacific
Islander (race)

Child of
White
Descent
(race)

Child
unable to
determine
race
(race)

Child of
Hispanic
Origin
(race)

Discharge
Reason

.008*

-.012*

.012*

.025*

.010*

-.046*

.028

.007

Exited to
emancipation

.009*

-.012*

.002

.034*

-.002

-.029*

-.011*

.022*

Total days
stay in foster
care

.028*

.001

.008*

-.134*

.007*

.113*

.024*

-.011*

Number of
placements

.007*

-.011*

.012*

-.090*

.006*

.059*

.041*

-.029*

Length of
previous FC
stay

.005

-.032*

-.001

-.040*

.001

.032*

.017*

-.038*

Total
number of
removals

.007*

.011*

.012*

-.090*

-.003**

.093*

-.010*

-.016*

Efficiency

.021*

.006

.016*

-.135*

.007**

.130*

.002

-.011*

Effectiveness

.012*

-.025*

.012*

.015*

.008*

-.036*

.033*

-.014*

*p <.01 **p<.05

Correlation analysis demographic variables, independent variables, efficiency and
effectiveness for fully privatized states. A correlation matrix was run with demographic
variables, independent variables, and the composite variables for efficiency and effectiveness.
As a result, children of Asian descent demonstrated significant correlations with all variables,
indicating that Asian children in care likely discharge back to their families of origin, stay in care
for short periods of time, have a small number of placements, and are not often removed more
than once from the home. African-American and Hispanic children demonstrated an inverted
relationship with majority of the variables: total days in care, number of placements, length of
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previous foster care stay, total number of removals, and efficiency. Thus, the more AfricanAmerican children come into the custody, the longer they are experiencing time in care, higher
placements, removals, and previous stays in foster care (See Table 4.5). These findings are in
conjunction with the literature that demonstrate that African-American children maintain an
overrepresentation within foster care system and are more likely to experience higher
placements, removals, and will likely experience recidivism within the system (Pecora et al.,
2000).
Table 4.5
Pearson r Correlation Coefficients for Race/Ethnicity Variables for Fully Privatized Systems
Variable

Child
Sex

American
Indian/
Alaskan
Native
(race)

Asian
(race

Child of
AfricanAmerican
Descent
(race)

Child of
Hawaiian/Pacific
Islander (race)

Child of
White
Descent
(race)

Child
unable to
determine
race
(race)

Child of
Hispanic
Origin
(race)

Discharge
Reason

.003

-.035*

.017*

.041*

.017*

-.080*

.080*

.003

Exited to
emancipation

.010*

-.003

.002

.028*

-.002

-.017*

-.016*

.036*

Total days
stay in foster
care

.023*

-.009*

.010*

-.128*

.010*

.102*

.011*

-.085*

Number of
placements

-.002

-.003

.018*

-.084*

.013*

.024*

.051*

-.071*

Length of
previous FC
stay

-.008

.009

.025*

-.112*

.005

.077*

.035*

-.047*

Total
number of
removals

.003

-.029*

.006**

-.048*

-.009*

.014*

.033*

-.079*

Efficiency

.007

.002

.023*

-.141*

.011

.104*

.031*

-.052*

.008**

-.043*

.019*

.029*

.013*

-.076*

.085*

-.017*

Effectiveness
*p <.01 **p<.05
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Correlation analysis independent variables and fully privatized states. A correlation
matrix was run with the independent variables for states that are fully privatized. Of the
predictor variables, total days in foster care and number of placements were most often
correlated with other variables. Children who have a higher amount of days in foster care were
more likely to: (a) have a higher number of placements, (b) have a longer previous stay in foster
care, (c) higher number of removals, and (d) their cases demonstrated higher rates of efficiency.
The variable exited to emancipation had an inverse relationship with all other variables that it
was correlated with. As a result, children who age-out of the system experience: (a) higher rates
of total days in care, (b) higher number of placements, (c) length of previous foster care stay, (d)
higher total number of removals, and (e) lower rates of efficiency. Given that children who ageout of the system do so as a result of a lack of identifiable permanency options, the relationship
between the age-out variable with all other variables coincide with literature findings (Pecora et
al, 2000) (See Table 4.6).
Correlation analysis demographic variables and partially privatized states. A
demographic correlation matrix was run for the states that were partially privatized. Of the
demographic variables, child of African-American descent and child of White descent (both race
variables) were most often correlated with other variables. Child of African-American descent
was correlated with (a) discharge reason, (b) exited to emancipation, (c) total days stay in care,
(d) number of placements, (e) length of previous foster care stay, (f) total number of removals,
(g) efficiency, and (h) effectiveness (See table 4.7). Thus, African-American children are more
likely to discharge to permanency placements outside of their family of origin and age out of the
foster care system (Pecora et al, 2000) in a partially privatized system.
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Table 4.6
Pearson r Coefficient for Independent Variables for Fully Privatized Systems
Number of
Placements

Length of
previous
FC Stay

Total
Number
of
Removals

Efficiency

Effectiveness

-.246*

-.110*

-.089*

-.104*

-.177*

.939*

---

-.222*

-.202*

-.122*

-.077*

-.213*

.430*

-.246*

-.222*

---

.477*

.568*

.213*

.951*

-.237*

Number of
placements

-.110*

-.202*

.477*

---

.083*

.082*

.352*

-.121*

Total
number of
removals

-.104

-.077*

.213*

.082*

---

---

---

-.220*

Length of
previous FC
stay

-.089

-.122*

.568*

.083*

---

---

.795*

-.113*

Efficiency

-,177*

-.213*

.951*

.352*

.795*

---

---

-.223*

.939

.430*

-.237*

-.121*

-113*

.220*

-.223*

---

Variable

Discharge
Reason

Exited to
Emancipation

Discharge
Reason

---

.360*

Exited to
emancipation

.360*

Total days
stay in foster
care

Effectiveness

Total
days in
care

*p <.01 **p<.05

Correlation analysis independent variables and partially privatized states. A correlation
matrix was used to assess the relationship and significance between the independent variables
and partially privatized states. Almost all of the variables demonstrated significant relationships,
except between the variables effectiveness and length of days in previous foster care stay (r= .032). There was a significant positive relationship demonstrated by the total number of days a
child has been in care. As a result of this analysis, in partially privatized systems, as the total
number of days increases for a child, so does the number of placements, length of days of the
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previous foster care stay, total number of removals and efficiency that the child experiences (see
Table 4.7).

Table 4.7
Pearson r Correlation Coefficients for Race/Ethnicity Variables for Partially Privatized Systems
Variable

Child
Sex

American
Indian/
Alaskan
Native
(race)

Asian
(race

Child of
AfricanAmerican
Descent
(race)

Child of
Hawaiian/Pacific
Islander (race)

Child of
White
Descent
(race)

Child
unable to
determine
race
(race)

Child of
Hispanic
Origin
(race)

Discharge
Reason

.006**

-.015*

-.007*

.034*

-.005**

.011*

-.091*

-.040*

Exited to
emancipation

.009*

-.017*

.002

.048*

-.002*

-.036*

-.023*

.016*

Total days
stay in foster
care

.021*

.033*

.006**

-.205*

.008*

.176*

.055*

.010*

Number of
placements

.002

.001

.008*

-.128*

.006*

.106*

.057*

-.001

Length of
previous FC
stay

.004

.020*

.005

-.114*

.009

.130*

-.030*

-.032*

Total
number of
removals

.001

.004

.003

-.076*

.002

.056*

.023

-.040*

Efficiency

.014**

.024*

.007

-.185*

.013**

.189*

.008

-.020*

Effectiveness

.007*

-.014*

-.004

.008*

-.005

.026*

-.075*

-.039*

*p <.01 **p<.05

Correlation analysis demographic variables and non-privatized states. A correlation
matrix was developed to analyze the relationship of demographic variables and non-privatized
states. The efficiency, child sex, child of Hispanic descent, and child of White descent variables
maintained positive significant relationships with all other variables (see Table 4.8).
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Table 4.8
Pearson r Correlation Coefficients for Race/Ethnicity Variables for Non-Privatized Systems
Variable

Child
Sex

American
Indian/
Alaskan
Native
(race)

Asian
(race

Child of
AfricanAmerican
Descent
(race)

Child of
Hawaiian/Pacific
Islander (race)

Child of
White
Descent
(race)

Child
unable to
determine
race
(race)

Child of
Hispanic
descent
(race)

Discharge
Reason

.011*

.004*

-.003

.021*

-.003

-.030*

-.008*

.043*

Exited to
emancipation

.008*

-.013*

.002

.027*

-.003

-.028*

-.004**

.017*

Total days
stay in foster
care

.037*

-.017*

.009*

-.081*

.005**

.060*

.047*

.033*

Number of
placements

.015*

-.019*

.009*

-.069*

.002

.049*

.035*

-.019*

Length of
previous FC
stay

.015*

.001

.015*

-.057*

.006

.046*

.018*

.014*

Total
number of
removals

.014*

-.052*

-.002

-.014*

.003

.016*

.029*

-.020*

Efficiency

.037*

-.011*

.024*

-.089*

.010*

.076*

.027*

.028*

Effectiveness

.016*

-.019*

-.004

.018*

-.001

-.024*

.003

.032*

*p <.01 **p<.05

Correlation analysis independent variables and non- privatized states. The correlation
matrix for non-privatized states displayed a variety of relationships between the independent
variables. Of the independent variables the following variables portrayed significant
relationships: (a) exited to emancipation, (b) discharge reason, (c) total days stay in foster care,
and (d) number of placements. One of the relationships demonstrated was a negative and
significant relationship between the number of placements a child experiences and effectiveness
(r= -.117). Literature supports that the more placements a child experiences, the less the child
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prospers while in care; thus, the results of the correlation analysis are supported by the literature
(Garstka, Collins-Camargo, Hall, Neal, & Ensign, 2012; Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003) (See
Table 4.9).
Table 4.9
Pearson r Coefficient for Independent Variables for Non- Privatized Systems
Variable

Discharge
Reason

Exited to
Emancipation

Total
days in
care

Number of
Placements

Length of
previous
FC Stay

Total
Number of
Removals

Efficiency

Effectiveness

---

.423*

-.104*

-.060*

-.027*

-.026*

-.089*

.917*

Exited to
emancipation

.423*

---

-.193*

-.200*

-.111*

-.075*

-.199*

.457*

Total days
stay in foster
care

-.179*

-.193*

---

.526*

.527*

.190*

.952*

-.076*

Number of
placements

-.118*

-.200*

.526*

---

.063*

.098*

.412*

-.038*

Total number
of removals

-.023*

-.075*

.190*

.098*

---

---

---

.361*

Length of
previous FC
stay

-.016*

-.111*

.527*

.063*

---

---

.761*

-.043

Efficiency

-.108*

-.199*

.952*

.412*

.761*

---

---

-.113*

Effectiveness

.921*

.457*

-.038*

-.043*

.361*

-.113*

---

Discharge
Reason

-.076*

*p <.01 **p<.05

DFA procedural steps. Four separate discriminant function analyses were run using the
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 22 that included an analysis of four
different DFA models to determine which variables discriminate amongst the following groups:
(1) fully privatized, (2) partially privatized, and (3) non-privatized. The first model used
discriminating variables that included: child sex, child of American Indian/Alaskan Native
descent, child of Asian descent, child of African-American descent, child of Hawaiian/Pacific
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Islander descent, child unable to determine race, child of Hispanic descent, discharge reason,
exited to emancipation, total days stay in foster care, number of placements, length of previous
foster care stay, and total number of removals.
The second DFA model consisted of the following discriminating variables: child sex,
child of American Indian/Alaskan Native descent, child of Asian descent, child of AfricanAmerican descent, child of Hawaiian/Pacific Islander descent, child unable to determine race,
child of Hispanic descent, discharge reason, exited to emancipation, total days stay in foster care,
number of placements, length of previous foster care stay, total number of removals and the
efficiency compound variable. The third DFA model included the following discriminating
variables: child sex, child of American Indian/Alaskan Native descent, child of Asian descent,
child of African-American descent, child of Hawaiian/Pacific Islander descent, child unable to
determine race, child of Hispanic descent, discharge reason, exited to emancipation, total days
stay in foster care, number of placements, length of previous foster care stay, total number of
removals and the effectiveness compound variable.
The fourth DFA model included the discriminating variables: child sex, child of
American Indian/Alaskan Native descent, child of Asian descent, child of African-American
descent, child of Hawaiian/Pacific Islander descent, child unable to determine race, child of
Hispanic descent, discharge reason, exited to emancipation, total days stay in foster care, number
of placements, length of previous foster care stay, total number of removals, the efficiency
compound variable, and the effectiveness compound variable.
Equality of Variance-Covariance Matrices. Box’s M test was utilized to test the
assumption that groups have equal variance-covariance matrices (Dattalo, 1994). Box’s M has
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two underlying assumptions: (1) within-group variances are equal for all variables, (2)
correlations between any two variables are similar among groups. For all of the models, equality
of variance-covariance matrices could not be assumed (Box’s M= 67592.77, F(182,
4890112662) = 371.27, p <.001 (Model 1); Box’s M =110471.16, F(90, 1.194) = 1227.29, p<
.001 (Model 2); Box’s M = 314904.89, F(90, 1.68) = 3498.82, p<.001 (Model 3); Box’s M = 61,
015.50, F(110, 4978768827) =, p<.001 (Model 4)) (see Table 4.10). However, DFA is sensitive
to large sample sizes, such as the sample used in this study, and there is empirical evidence to
suggest that DFA is robust against the violation of the equality of variance-covariance
assumption (Dattalo, 1994).
Table 4.10
Box’s M Results for DFA Models
DFA Model

Box’s M

Equality of
Variance (Yes/No)

General Model (Model
1)

Box’s M= 67592.77, F(182, 4890112662) = 371.27, p <.001

No

Full Privatized (Model
2)

Box’s M =110471.16, F(90, 1.194) = 1227.29, p< .001

No

Partially Privatized
(Model 3)

Box’s M = 314904.89, F(90, 1.68) = 3498.82, p<.001

No

Non-Privatized (Model
4)

Box’s M = 61, 015.50, F(110, 4978768827) =, p<.001

No

DFA Model-General (Model One)
Discriminant function and F-test (general model). The general model consisted of the
following variables: child sex, child of American Indian/Alaskan Native descent, child of Asian
descent, child of African-American descent, child of Hawaiian/Pacific Islander descent, child
unable to determine race, child of Hispanic descent, discharge reason, exited to emancipation,
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total days stay in foster care, number of placements, length of previous foster care stay, and total
number of removals. The three-group discriminant analysis produced two discriminant functions,
which represents the best uncorrelated linear combination of predictors that separates the groups
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). For the general DFA model, the first function had a canonical
correlation of .331, whereas the second function had a canonical correlation of .169. For
functions one through two, Wilk’s Lambda equaled .865, Chi-square (26, N= 73, 193) 10,623,
p<.001. For function two, Wilk’s Lambda equaled .971, Chi square (12, N= 73, 193) 2124, p<
.001. Therefore, the H

of no differences among group centroids is rejected, and the function

explains 13.5 percent of the variance among the states that are fully privatized, partially
privatized, or non-privatized for functions one through two. Function two explains 2.9 percent
of the variance among the groups of states and the H

of no differences among group centroids

also is rejected. A discriminant score is a weighted linear combination (sum) of the
discriminating variables. A group centroid is the mean value of the discriminant score for a given
category of the dependent variable (i.e., group). They are a measure of how well the discriminant
function distinguishes between/among groups.
Standardized coefficients were used to compare a variable’s relative relationship to a
function. These coefficients are summarized by function in the Appendix (See Appendix A). In
this model, the two variables with the strongest relative relation to the function were: discharge
reason and child unable to determine race (see Table 4.11). Structure coefficients were also used
to compare a variable’s relationship to a function (See Appendix B). In this instance, these
coefficients were consistent with the standardized coefficients (See Table 4.12).
Classification of cases. Overall, approximately 49% of the original grouped cases were
classified correctly. For group one, states that are fully privatized, 48% of the cases were
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correctly classified. For group two, states that are partially privatized, 32% of the cases were
correctly classified. Lastly, for group three, states that are not privatized, 59% of the cases were
correctly classified.
DFA Model -Efficiency (Model Two)
Discriminant function and F-test (efficiency model). The second DFA model consisted of
the following variables: child sex, child of American Indian/Alaskan Native descent, child of
Asian descent, child of African-American descent, child of Hawaiian/Pacific Islander descent,
child unable to determine race, child of Hispanic descent, discharge reason, exited to
emancipation, total days stay in foster care, number of placements, length of previous foster care
stay, total number of removals, the efficiency compound variable, and the state levels of
privatization. The three-group discriminant analysis produced two discriminant functions. For
the efficiency model, the first function had a canonical correlation of .317, whereas the second
function had a canonical correlation of .169. For functions one through two, Wilk’s Lambda
equaled .881, Chi-square (18, N= 97, 811) 12, 359, p<.001. For function two, Wilk’s Lambda
equaled .980, Chi square (8, N= 97, 811) 2011, p< .001. Therefore, the H

of no differences

among group centroids is rejected, and the function explains 12 percent of the variance among
the states that are fully privatized, partially privatized, or non-privatized for functions one
through two. Function two explains 2 percent of the variance among groups of states and the
H

of no differences among group centroids also is rejected.
Standardized Coefficients (efficiency model). In the efficiency model, one variable had

the strongest relation to function one (r= .5 or above): child unable to determine race (see Table
4.11). Structure coefficients were also used to compare a variable’s relationship to a function
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(see Table 4.12). In this instance, these coefficients were consistent with the standardized
coefficients. See Appendix C and Appendix D for coefficient summaries by function.
Classification of cases (efficiency model). Overall, approximately 49% of the original
grouped cases were classified correctly. For group one, states that are fully privatized, 26% of
the cases were correctly classified. For group two, states that are partially privatized, 39% of the
cases were correctly classified. Lastly, for group three, states that are not privatized, 48% of the
cases were correctly classified.
DFA Model -Effectiveness (Model Three)
Discriminant function and F-test (effectiveness model). The third DFA model consisted
of the following variables: child sex, child of American Indian/Alaskan Native descent, child of
Asian descent, child of African-American descent, child of Hawaiian/Pacific Islander descent,
child unable to determine race, child of Hispanic descent, discharge reason, exited to
emancipation, total days stay in foster care, number of placements, length of previous foster care
stay, total number of removals, the effectiveness compound variable, and the state levels of
privatization. The three-group discriminant analysis produced two discriminant functions. For
the effectiveness model, the first function had a canonical correlation of .281, whereas the
second function had a canonical correlation of .130. For functions one through two, Wilk’s
Lambda equaled .906, Chi-square (18, N= 492, 911) 48, 857, p<.001. For function two, Wilk’s
Lambda equaled .983, Chi square (8, N= 492, 911) 8362, p< .001. Therefore, the H

of no

differences among group centroids is rejected, and the function explains 9 percent of the variance
among the states that are fully privatized, partially privatized, or non-privatized for functions one
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through two. Function two explains 2 percent of the variance among the group of states and the
H

of no differences among group centroids is also rejected.
Standardized Coefficients (effectiveness model). In the effectiveness model, two

variables had the strongest relation to function one (r= .5 or above): child unable to determine
race and the effectiveness (See Table 4.11). Structure coefficients were also used to compare a
variable’s relationship to a function (See Table 4.12). In this instance, these coefficients were
consistent with the standardized coefficients. See Appendix E and Appendix F for coefficient
summaries by function.
Classification of cases (effectiveness model). Overall, approximately 49% of the original
grouped cases were classified correctly. For group one, states that are fully privatized, 42% of
the cases were correctly classified. For group two, states that are partially privatized, 26% of the
cases were correctly classified. Lastly, for group three, states that are not privatized, 63% of the
cases were correctly classified.
DFA Model-Efficiency and Effectiveness (Model Four)
Discriminant function and F-test (efficiency and effectiveness model). The fourth DFA
model consisted of the following variables: child sex, child of American Indian/Alaskan Native
descent, child of Asian descent, child of African-American descent, child of Hawaiian/Pacific
Islander descent, child unable to determine race, child of Hispanic descent, discharge reason,
exited to emancipation, total days stay in foster care, number of placements, length of previous
foster care stay, total number of removals, the efficiency compound variable, the effectiveness
compound variable, and the state levels of privatization. The three-group discriminant analysis
produced two discriminant functions. For the efficiency and effectiveness model, the first
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function had a canonical correlation of .314, whereas the second function had a canonical
correlation of .150. For functions one through two, Wilk’s Lambda equaled .881, Chi-square
(20, N= 73, 193) 9,258, p<.001. For function two, Wilk’s Lambda equaled .978, Chi square (12,
N= 73, 193) 2124, p< .001. Therefore, the H

of no differences among group centroids is

rejected, and the function explains 12 percent of the variance among the states that are fully
privatized, partially privatized, or non-privatized for functions one through two. Function two
explains 2 percent of the variance among the groups of states and the H

of no differences

among group centroids is also rejected.
Standardized Coefficients (efficiency and effectiveness model). In the effectiveness
model, two variables had the strongest relation to function one (r= .5 or above): child unable to
determine race and the effectiveness (See Table 4.11). Structure coefficients were also used to
compare a variable’s relationship to a function (See Table 4.12). In this instance, these
coefficients were consistent with the standardized coefficients. See Appendix G and Appendix
H for coefficient summaries by function.
Classification of cases (efficiency and effectiveness model). Overall, approximately 50%
of the original grouped cases were classified correctly. For group one, states that are fully
privatized, 49% of the cases were correctly classified. For group two, states that are partially
privatized, 27% of the cases were correctly classified. Lastly, for group three, states that are not
privatized, 61% of the cases were correctly classified.
DFA Model Results
Four DFA models were run in an effort to differentiate three levels of privatization of the
foster care system. Overall, the models slightly to moderately discriminate among the three
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groups of states based on levels of privatization (see Table 4.13). The grand means (i.e.,
centroids) for Model 1 (General Model) were as follows: fully privatized, .742; partially
privatized, -.042; non-privatized, -.219; for Model 2 (Efficiency Model) fully privatized, .531;
partially privatized, -.103; non-privatized, -.263; for Model 3 (Effectiveness Model) fully
privatized, .676; partially privatized, -.029; non-privatized, -.168; and for Model 4 (Efficiency
and Effectiveness Model) fully privatized, .692; partially privatized, -.015; non-privatized, -.217.
These results suggest that the models slightly to moderately discriminate among the three groups
of states based on levels of privatization. Specifically, non-privatized foster care systems
differentiate the most from fully privatized and partially privatized foster care systems.
This analysis also suggests that there are slight to moderate differences between fully
privatized, partially privatized, and non-privatized foster care systems and their rates of
efficiency and effectiveness (see Table 4.11). Specifically, these results suggest that the nonprivatized groups are both more efficient and more effective, with standardized coefficients for
function 1 of 0.015 and 0.712 respectively (see Table 4.11).
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Table 4.11
Standardized Coefficients Summary for the Four DFA Models
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Function1

Function2

Function1

Function2

Function1

Function2

Function1

Function2

.811

.304

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

.653

.096

.712

.333

.510

-.082

.843

.229

.610

-.066

.553

-.039

---

---

.206

-.080

---

---

.015

-.082

Total Days Stay
in Foster Care

.149

.540

---

---

---

---

---

---

Asian

.099

.112

.205

.243

.179

.252

.102

.237

Hawaiian/Pacific
Islander

.099

.112

.178

.148

.115

.154

.106

.137

Child Sex

-.007

-.046

.008

-.047

-.007

-.008

-.006

-.043

Number of
Placements

-.023

-.506

---

---

---

---

---

---

AfricanAmerican

-.033

-.096

.040

-.120

-.027

.027

-.030

-.099

Hispanic

-.087

-.356

-.136

-.345

-.296

-.649

-.080

-.399

American
Indian/AK
Native

-.106

.489

-.083

.616

-.085

.414

-.118

.549

Exited to
Emancipation

-.200

-.110

---

---

---

---

---

---

White

-.210

.498

-.165

.597

-.174

.561

-.223

.554

Length of
Previous FC
Stay

-.257

-.342

---

---

---

---

---

---

Rc

.331

.169

.317

.143

.281

.130

.314

.150

Wilk's

.865

.971

.881

.980

.906

.983

.881

.978

Discharge
Reason
Effectiveness
Child Unable to
Determine Race
Efficiency
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Table 4.12
Structure Coefficients Summary of the Four DFA Models
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Function1

Function2

Function1

Function2

Function1

Function2

Function1

Function2

.721

.196

---

---

---

---

---

---

Effectiveness

---

---

---

---

.642

.066

.729

.278

Child Unable to
Determine Race

.595

-.233

.901

.078

.656

-.293

.636

-.201

Exited to
Emancipation

.189

.001

---

---

---

---

---

---

Number of
Placements

.037

-.228

---

---

---

---

---

---

Efficiency

---

---

.204

-.185

---

---

.121

-.101

Asian

.112

.184

.186

.221

.181

.220

.114

.221

Hawaiian/Pacific
Islander

.110

.134

.171

.168

.126

.167

.113

.163

AfricanAmerican

.034

-.539

-.031

-.725

-.026

-.490

.049

-.606

Child Sex

.005

-.031

.006

-.043

-.004

-.004

.006

-.035

Total Days Stay
in Foster Care

-.059

.146

---

---

---

---

---

---

Hispanic

-.083

-.403

-.294

-.432

-.237

-.702

-.078

-.465

American
Indian/AK
Native

-.101

.420

-.118

.537

-.091

.325

-.117

.465

Length of
Previous FC
Stay

-.185

-.022

---

---

---

---

---

---

White

-.350

.534

-.491

.534

-.354

.563

-.384

.568

Rc

.331

.169

.317

.143

.281

.130

.314

.150

Wilk's

.865

.971

.881

.980

.906

.983

.881

.978

Discharge
Reason
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Table 4.13
Correct Classification of Cases for Each Model
Model 1
(General)

Model 2

Model 3
(Effectiveness)

(Efficiency)

Model 4
(Efficiency and
Effectiveness)

Overall
Classification

49%

49%

49%

50%

Privatized

48%

26%

42%

49%

Partially-Privatized

32%

39%

26%

27%

Non-Privatized

59%

48%

63%

61%
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Chapter Five: Discussion
There have been many states that have transitioned their state-run systems to privatized
systems that utilize private organizations for service provision. From a business perspective,
privatization has the potential to enhance systemic operations, given that it provides costeffective service provision, development of performance outcomes, and increased systemic data
collection (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003). In other words, privatization of foster care utilizes
a rational process of human service management (Hansenfield, 2000). The privatization model
is formulated on A) setting goals, objectives, and strategies, b) organizing, identifying, arranging
work to carry out plans, C) mobilizing people to do the work, D) planning use of financial
resources to attain goal, E) supervising, and F) evaluating the program (Hasenfield, 2000).
Though those business components are positive and may enhance systemic functioning, the
experience of the child in care, with relation to their trajectory within the system, appears to be
missing from the conversation. Having an emphasis on systemic efficiency, without considering
how efficiency is connected to the experience of the child and their well-being within the system
(effectiveness) can be viewed as problematic.
In other words, it is important to remember that children within the foster care system,
such as Jasmine and James who were discussed within Chapter One, live within the foster care
system and their experiences are real. The foster care system has a primary purpose to ensure
the safety and well-being of the children in its care, yet the emphasis of the system has
transitioned from maintaining an emphasis on the child and the family, to specifically honing in
on outcomes that are meant to be connected to the child, but are actually intent on observation of
the efficiency of the system itself.
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Privatization of the foster care system has transitioned state-run foster care systems with
the underlying perspectives of increasing systemic efficiency and effectiveness of the system, yet
there has been little empirical research conducted regarding what efficiency and effectiveness
means. Also, there has been minimal research that has identified whether or not levels of
privatization are different in any way.
This study was conducted in an effort to not only develop language and empirical support
regarding what exactly systemic efficiency and effectiveness of the foster care system could be
defined as, but also to ensure that the child remained at the epicenter of those systemic
definitions. In utilizing a perspective of the child at the center of the study, this study differs
from previous research in that it has an emphasis in not only assessing privatization of the foster
care system from a systems perspective, but also including the trajectory experience of the child
as a primary focus; thus integrating both micro and macro social work perspectives.
This chapter begins with a review of the limitations of the data, a synopsis of the study’s
purpose, discussion of efficiency and effectiveness, research design, data collection and data
analysis. Next, the sections present a summary of the study’s significant findings, along with a
discussion of findings in relation to social justice and the profession of social work. Lastly, there
are sections discussing the implications for the connection of the results to social work and social
justice, direct practice (macro and micro), social work education, and policy implications for
social work.
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Interpretation of the Data
Limitations of Data
Secondary Data. Data were used from the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and
Reporting System (AFCARS), a federally mandated data collection system overseen by the
Children’s Bureau intended to provide case specific information on all children during their
placement in the public child welfare system (United States Department of Health and Human
Services, 2011). This dataset was chosen, primarily because it is one of the only datasets that is
inclusive of all 50 states and territories data on all children in state’s custody; thus, it was the
only way to compare all systems from across the nation; particularly the systemic functioning of
each foster care system, with regard to trajectory experience of the child. Utilization of
secondary data can be controversial, given that the study conducted was not the original purpose
of the data (Rubin & Babbie, 2013). However, it also offers the ability to explore established
datasets and address the methodological concerns within those data sets (Secret & Peck-Heath,
2004).
State Limitations. One of the primary limitations to this study was that the data were
supplied by individual states, so it is not known how accurate the information each state provided
may be. States have the ability to alter information prior to submitting it and unless knowledge
of how the foster care system is run in each state is known, the authenticity of the data provided
cannot be trusted.
Other state limitations lie in the manner in which each state public child welfare system is
run and the level of information the state provides to the public. The diversity of the state’s
management of public child welfare was somewhat problematic. In this study, there were
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barriers regarding the acquisition of accurate state-level information regarding the level of
privatization each state utilized. There was little information on state websites regarding how
systems functioned, and if information was provided it was incredibly outdated. In an effort to
acquire state information, numerous individuals were contacted; however, identifying which
individual had the most updated and accurate information was problematic. Many individuals
did not understand what privatization meant and could not identify anyone in their organization
that had access to that information, besides an administrator. Also, in discussing privatization
with administrators and researchers with regard to their state functioning, it became apparent that
states were piloting privatization in many different ways. There were also some states that
utilized phrases such as “public-private partnership”, so the state system did not agree with being
considered privatized. This became a limitation in determining where states should be placed
within the analysis. As a result, there were state’s that were placed within levels of privatization
that may not agree with where their placement lies within this study.
Essentially, it became evident that when trying to compare state foster care systems, the
difficulty lies in that the states differ from one another in a variety of capacities. The only
commonality between each state is their client: the child. Other than the emphasis on the child in
need of care, state foster care systems are dissimilar, because the state operations dramatically
vary from state to state. However, even with the state differences and the difficulties of the
dataset, having some information regarding their functionality is better than having no
information at all.
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Data Analysis
This study utilized a discriminant function analysis (DFA) to assess the three levels of
privatization and whether or not there were any differences between each level, as well as each
model’s rate of efficiency and effectiveness. The results of the data analysis suggest that there
are some differences between foster care systems that are fully privatized, partially privatized,
and non-privatized. Ultimately, the analysis demonstrated that non-privatized foster care
systems demonstrate higher rates of efficiency and effectiveness.
Levels of Privatization. Efficiency and effectiveness have been asserted as two of the
primary reasons for a state’s transition to privatization (Hubel, Schreier, Hansen, & Wilcox,
2013; Ram, 2012; Chi et al., 2003; Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003; Paulson, et al., 2002;
Gillespie, 2000; Petr & Johnson, 1999). Within the public child welfare system, privatization
enhances efficiency through cost-effectiveness (Hubel, Schreier, Hansen, & Wilcox, 2013;
Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003) of service provision; whereas effectiveness has been
conceptualized as client improvement (Gillespie, 2000), which for this study, is viewed through
the lens of a child’s trajectory of experience in care.
In this study, the results from the analysis suggest that there are slight to moderate
differences between foster care systems that are classified as fully privatized, partially privatized,
and non-privatized. This finding of differences between the levels of privatization is one of the
first in research that is supported by empirical evidence from a national database inclusive of
public child welfare information. Reasons for the differences may be attributed to the structural
differences between systems that are fully privatized, in which private organizations provide all
of the service provision versus a non-privatized system in which the state is solely responsible
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for all service provision. Another possible reason for the systemic differentiation may be
attributed to which portion of the public child welfare system is privatized (i.e. family
preservation, foster care, or adoption), as well as how many portions of the system are privatized.
Nonetheless, the non-privatized system demonstrated the strongest differentiation between all
levels of privatization.
Efficiency. Majority of the literature, regarding privatization of foster care, mentions
efficiency in some manner (Roin, 2012; Ram, 2010; Steen & Duran, 2010; Freundlich &
Gerstenzang, 2003; Gillespie, 2000; Petr & Johnson, 1999). The primary argument for
utilization or privatization is often that the model will increase systemic efficiency; however,
there has been little discussion regarding what exactly efficiency means, or whether or not
different levels of privatization have different rates of efficiency. Within this study, efficiency is
operationalized as the cost of service provision; thus, it is connected to the total number of days a
child is in care, the number of placements a child experiences, and the length of time a child
spent previously in custody. Each of these variables is directly connected to the cost of care for
the child, as well as the outcomes that are determined by the federal government and adhered to
by individual states.
The results of this study demonstrated that non-privatized states have higher rates of
efficiency; whereas states that are partially privatized or fully privatized have lower rates of
efficiency. In other words, fully privatized states incur higher costs than states that are partially
privatized or non-privatized. Reasons for fully privatized states incurring more costs related to
care, could be that the costs of care for the child may be more expensive, hiring more qualified
workers could increase costs, the price being paid to the private provider may be more than a
typical state-rate, or children may be being discharged from care, but experiencing rates of
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recidivism more frequently. On the other hand, non-privatized states may maintain lower costs
as a result of ensuring cost-effective service provision.
Effectiveness. Often times, literature also discusses systemic effectiveness as a measure
of successful privatization implementation (Pecora et al., 2010; Freundlich & Gerstenzang,
2003). In this study, effectiveness was observed via the rate of the improvement of the child
while in care. This was observed with total number of removals, exit to emancipation, and a
child’s discharge reason from care. The results from this study indicate that non-privatized
foster care systems have higher rates of effectiveness than partially privatized or fully privatized
systems. Reasons for higher rates of effectiveness may be the result of higher rates of achieved
permanency, better service provision, lower rates of child recidivism within the system, or lower
rates of children aging out of the system.
Implications for Social Work and Social Justice
Children within the foster care system have faced traumatic situations, not only as a result
of the reason that supports their placement in custody, but also by nature of having their guardian
being the state. Historically, the children placed in the foster care system maintain socially
inequitable positions, as a result of their systematic positionality. The overall goal of the foster
care system is to provide safety, timely permanence, assurance that a child is safe from harm,
and to assist families in their overall capacity to care for children (Pecora et al., 2000). The foster
care system is an entity that is formulated to ensure that children are not living in environments
that are unsafe; however, the foster care system is not equipped to provide the parental or
supervisory necessities that are needed for a child to transition into a healthy or successful adult.
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With the state being responsible for the care of children, it is imperative that the
profession of social work begin to transition towards conceptualizing and approaching practice
within public child welfare with a lens that acknowledges the differences between how systems
are run. Understanding the differences and similarities between public child welfare systems,
even within the same level of privatization, has the potential to be useful with enhancing
systemic functioning and overall service provision to children. Along with the lens regarding
systemic differences, comprehension of the impact of privatization of public child welfare on the
well-being of children needs to be addressed as well. Within this study, the results demonstrated
that children are staying in care longer and are experiencing more placements in systems that are
privatized than in systems that are not privatized. Data analysis also demonstrated that
privatized and partially privatized systems also demonstrated higher rates of children aging out
of care, which is demonstrative of a higher system failure rate than non-privatized foster care
systems. Thus, to continue to imply that privatization of public child welfare does not have an
impact on the care provided to children, does not align with the results of this study. As a result,
there is a necessity to incorporate knowledge of privatization of public child welfare into the
dialogue regarding children in care, as long as privatization models are being utilized throughout
the nation.
Social work direct practice. Given the prevalence of privatization and its continued
expansion throughout the country, direct service practitioners have an obligation to gain more
knowledge regarding the implication of privatization on the public child welfare system and the
children served. Findings from this study suggest that fully privatized and partially privatized
foster care systems incur higher costs and provide less effective services for children in care.
Consequently, the results of this study suggest that children discharge at lesser rates, remain in
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care for longer periods of time, and experience more placement settings in systems that have
some level of privatization.
These findings regarding practice suggest that more information is needed to determine
what is happening in foster care programs throughout the nation. Evaluation of foster care
programs and practice evaluation of workers providing services are necessary to allow for
meaningful comparisons between models of practice. Information regarding the functioning of
foster care programs from state to state would assist in the development of research definitions
that are meaningful to workers in direct practice, which would allow for better comparisons
between models of privatization from state to state. These forms of comparison would assist
practice evaluation, policy making and general aspects of research design related to assessing
state foster care systems.
Social work education. A popular of area of social work practice lies within the public
child welfare system. Public child welfare is an interesting sector of social work practice,
because it combines both macro and micro practice components. The macro components are a
result of the system being grounded in bureaucracy; whereas the micro component lies in the
direct practice occurring between workers and children and families. As social work practice
progresses, there is a lessening of emphasis in academic programs on macro practice, particularly
as it relates to large system practice regarding administration and management, rather than policy
analysis and advocacy. More effort towards enhanced knowledge of privatization of public child
welfare, its connection to efficiency and effective service provision, can be included in micro and
macro practice of social work. Given the longevity that privatization has had within public child
welfare, decreasing macro practice education is a detriment to those who desire to serve children
and families from a macro perspective.
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As a result of the prevalence of privatization, it is important that social work curricula be
inclusive of current child welfare practice models that are being utilized within the public child
welfare system, such as privatization. Public child welfare has various levels of complexity, due
to the combination of micro and macro practice, along with the bureaucracy that the public child
welfare system is grounded in being connected to state and federal government.
Social work academia. As social work academia is transitioning to maintaining a stronger
research emphasis, academics must remember that the root of social work is grounded in
practice. Social work, as a profession, has a history of seeking legitimization through the
professionalization of the field (Fauri, Netting, O’Connor, Coles, & Prorock-Ernest, 2014) from
areas such as the acquisition of title protection to clinical licensure. At this time, the
legitimization has transitioned into the realm of research; thus, research has become dominant in
academia, yet it is not always grounded in practice and a disconnect between research and
practice is evident. Research that is not grounded in social work practice cannot be translated
well to practitioners in the field. Without research translation to social work practitioners
occurring, the purpose of research is lost. Thus, the intersection between research and practice
needs to become more sophisticated regarding complex issues and social problems.
Social work practice is the grounding that academia needs to be based in, so that
curriculum and research can be reflective of what is current in social work practice. This will
allow for students to grow and learn from a more updated perspective, so that they are better
prepared when they enter into social work practice.
Policy implications for social work. Besides enhancing social work education and
social work practice in its knowledge regarding privatization, there are also considerations for
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policy development. Currently, the dominant policies guiding the public child welfare system
have an emphasis on ensuring the safety and well-being of the children in care. However,
federal child welfare policy does not address the implementation of privatization models, or the
impact on the child from the care provided when transitions within systems occur as a result of
shifts in privatization. State systems are permitted to transition the functioning of their systems
in any way that will continue to allow them to attain the goals set by the federal government.
Some ways to address privatization through policy may be for each state to develop policies
regarding the implementation and transition to privatization. Given that many states currently
use some form of privatization, federal level policies that mandate how privatization is
conducted is a necessity to assure equal treatment within the system and to ensure that
comparative research and evaluation occurs.
Direction for future research. Comparing state foster care systems is complex and has
its difficulties; thus, there were limitations within this study. First, knowledge regarding the
functioning of the system is not easily accessible and those with current and accurate information
are child welfare administrators and researchers. Many of the mid-level or direct service
practitioners that were communicated with did not have accurate knowledge regarding the
functioning of their system, or knowledge related to the meaning of privatization. As a result,
more privatization research, at the state level, needs to be conducted, as well as translated to
direct service practitioners. It is important that research is conducted for and translated to all
levels of practitioners, particularly direct service practitioners because there are implications for
their practice as a result of the privatization of the system.
A second limitation of this study was grounded within the differences between state
foster care systems. The variation between state systems makes it difficult to compare the state
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foster care systems, because their differences are unknown to those outside of the state. State
foster care systems also function as individual silos; thus, there is little communication between
state systems that may have similarities. A mechanism to overcome these state differences is to
develop more communication between administrators in each state, so that states can learn from
one another and gain other perspectives into privatization mechanisms that are working or not
working in states that have similar operational systems.
In moving social work research forward, many areas could be considered for future
research. For example, one focus of public child welfare research needs to be on how
privatization is functioning within the individual states, and whether or not the models being
utilized are appropriate for the state using each model. For example, states such as Nebraska
have transitioned to fully privatized systems (Hornby & Zeller, 2015); however, if stronger
research was conducted, results of findings may have indicated that the state was more
appropriately suited for another level of privatization, or should remain a non-privatized state.
Consequently, to begin assessing the appropriate use of privatization, states need to conduct
more research regarding the functioning of their privatized public child welfare systems, as
opposed to evaluations that tend to present privatization as positive or negative. Research
regarding privatization of public child welfare and whether it is positive or negative is
informative; however, there are deeper research needs in determining the issues with how
privatization is defined from state to state, along with state comprehension of what their overall
goals are in utilizing a model of privatization.
Another area of expansion needed in future research would be in comprehending how
privatization impacts the workforce. Public child welfare research is often focused solely on
“the system”; however, research needs to shift its emphasis and include all stakeholders involved
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with the system as well. Currently, very little research has been conducted regarding the
perspectives of the individuals working within the different levels of the public child welfare
system, with relation to the models of privatization being used by states. Thus, research
regarding the perspectives of administrators, clients, families, and the communities involved with
the public child welfare system in states utilizing models of privatization are needed as well.
Future research studies focusing on direct service workers, supervisors, and administrators and
their impressions of privatization from a practice perspective, as well as an employment
perspective would assist in gaining understanding of privatization of a system and its relationship
to employment. Also, gaining an understanding of how children and families are being served
by systems that are privatized would be helpful for service providers, as well as policy makers.
As a result, this requires that research transitions towards including the actual processes of
service delivery to gain knowledge regarding systemic functioning. Expanding research in this
manner would provide information regarding how privatization is impacting the individuals
involved with the system. This perspective assists in the knowledge regarding the implications
for privatization from the human perspective, which will enhance system and organizational
knowledge, while also ensuring that children and their well-being remain the epicenter of the
public child welfare system.
Large dataset use in future studies. Ideally, using large existing datasets as a mechanism
to understand more about privatization would be optimal in understanding how privatization is
functioning throughout public child welfare systems nationwide. For example, a state-based
pilot, specifically targeting data collection, that was funded by the Children’s Bureau would
allow for a comparative study for all states. The results of the pilot could provide the states with
reliable information regarding their systemic efficiency and effectiveness that was empirically
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based, while also re-engaging interest in dialogue regarding privatization and the implications on
children and families.
Another way of gaining the data regarding privatization of state public child welfare
systems is to encourage the Children’s Bureau to fund states for the acquisition of more targeted
data collection, specifically on a more thorough comprehension of the experience of the child in
care; outside of information such as number of placements, the total number of times a child has
been in care, or categories that are limiting in understanding what is happening to a child in care.
Information regarding the child’s education, mental health treatment, and overall well-being are
essential to truly understanding how privatization is impacting a system, as well as how the
functioning of state systems is assisting the child in care.
While using a national dataset was important to convey an understanding of the state of
foster care within this country, better data needs to be collected with regard to the public child
welfare system. The data that have been collected provides general information regarding the
children within the system; however, the data do not accurately depict the experience of the child
while in the care of the state. The data accurately depicts the “system”; but, what about the
child? More data collection needs to occur that has a sole emphasis on the experience of the
child.
Research regarding the disproportionality of children of color in care. It is a wellestablished fact that children of color are disproportionately represented within the public child
welfare system (Blackstone, Buck, & Hakim, 2004; Pecora et al., 2000; Craig et al., 1998), but
what that means for the system and how systemic changes should occur needs to be researched
as well. It is not enough to state that children of color are disproportionately represented,
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because to state it means little. Research questions such as: What is the experience of a child of
color within the foster care system? Are there differences between the experiences of children
of color and other children within the foster care system? If there are differences between the
experiences of children of color and other children within the foster care system, what are those
differences? These questions would need to be answered by including mental health,
educational, and all other information regarding the overall well-being of children in care. The
system has a responsibility to develop interventions and evaluations based on research, regarding
how the system can provide sufficient care to ethnically diverse children.
Conclusion
Privatization of public child welfare has greatly increased over the last two decades
throughout the nation. Currently, there are three models of privatization of public child welfare
being utilized throughout the nation: fully privatized, partially privatized, or non-privatized.
Despite the prevalence of privatization, very little empirical research has been conducted to
determine whether or not there are systemic differences between the models of privatization, as
well as which model demonstrates higher rates of efficiency or effectiveness. This research
study is a preliminary attempt in furthering knowledge in the area of privatization of public child
welfare. Findings from this study suggest that non-privatized foster care systems demonstrate
higher rates of efficiency and effectiveness. However, until there is stronger data regarding
privatization of public child welfare, a full view of its impact on the children, workers, and
organizations involved within the system is not possible. Therefore, there is a great need for
increased research within the area of privatization of public child welfare and its implications for
the children that the system serves.
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Appendix A
Standardized Canonical Coefficients-General Model

Function
1
Child Sex
Child Amer Indian/AK
Native
Child Asian
Child Black/African Amer
Child Hawaiian/Pacif
Islander
Child White
Child Unable To Determine
Race
Child Hispanic Origin
Discharge Reason
Exited to Emancipation and
Age
Total days stay in FCrecoded
Number of Placements
Recoded
Length of Previous FC
Stay-recoded (days)
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2

-.007

-.046

-.106

.489

.099

.203

-.033

-.096

.099

.112

-.210

.498

.510

-.082

-.087

-.356

.811

.304

-.200

-.110

.149

.540

-.023

-.506

-.257

-.342

Appendix B
Structured Matrix-General Model

Function
1
Discharge Reason

2
*

.196

.595*

-.233

.189*

.001

-.185*

-.022

.034

-.539*

-.350

.534*

-.101

.420*

-.083

-.403*

.037

-.228*

.112

.184*

-.059

.146*

.110

.134*

.005

-.031*

.721

Child Unable To Determine
Race
Exited to Emancipation and
Age >= 18
Length of Previous FC
Stay-recoded (days)
Child Black/African Amer
Child White
Child Amer Indian/AK
Native
Child Hispanic Origin
Number of Placements
Recoded
Child Asian
Total days stay in FCrecoded
Child Hawaiian/Pacif
Islander
Child Sex

Pooled within-groups correlations between
discriminating variables and standardized canonical
discriminant functions
Variables ordered by absolute size of correlation
within function.
*. Largest absolute correlation between each variable
and any discriminant function
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Appendix C
Standardized Canonical Coefficients- Efficiency Model

Function
1
Child Sex

2
.008

-.047

-.083

.616

Child Asian

.205

.243

Child Black/African Amer

.040

-.120

.178

.148

-.165

.597

.843

.229

-.136

-.345

.206

-.080

Child Amer Indian/AK
Native

Child Hawaiian/Pacif
Islander
Child White
Child Unable To Determine
Race
Child Hispanic Origin
Efficiency Composite
Variable
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Appendix D
Structure Matrix - Efficiency Model

Function
1
Child Unable To Determine

2

.901*

.078

.204*

-.185

.171*

.168

-.031

-.725*

-.118

.537*

Child White

-.491

.534*

Child Hispanic Origin

-.294

-.432*

Child Asian

.186

.221*

Child Sex

.006

-.043*

Race
Efficiency Composite
Variable
Child Hawaiian/Pacif
Islander
Child Black/African Amer
Child Amer Indian/AK
Native

Pooled within-groups correlations between
discriminating variables and standardized canonical
discriminant functions
Variables ordered by absolute size of correlation
within function.
*. Largest absolute correlation between each variable
and any discriminant function
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Appendix E
Standardized Canonical Coefficients- Effectiveness Model

Function
1
Child Sex
Child Amer Indian/AK
Native
Child Asian
Child Black/African Amer
Child Hawaiian/Pacif
Islander
Child White
Child Unable To Determine
Race
Child Hispanic Origin
Effectiveness Compostive
Variable
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2

-.007

-.008

-.085

.414

.179

.252

-.027

.027

.115

.154

-.174

.561

.610

-.066

-.269

-.649

.653

.096

Appendix F
Structure Matrix-Effectiveness Model

Function
1
Child Unable To Determine

2

.656*

-.293

.642*

.066

-.004*

-.004

Child Hispanic Origin

-.237

-.702*

Child White

-.354

.563*

Child Black/African Amer

-.026

-.490*

-.091

.325*

.181

.220*

.126

.167*

Race
Effectiveness Compostive
Variable
Child Sex

Child Amer Indian/AK
Native
Child Asian
Child Hawaiian/Pacif
Islander

Pooled within-groups correlations between
discriminating variables and standardized canonical
discriminant functions
Variables ordered by absolute size of correlation
within function.
*. Largest absolute correlation between each variable
and any discriminant function
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Appendix G
Standardized Canonical Coefficients- Efficiency and Effectiveness Model

Function
1
Child Sex
Child Amer Indian/AK
Native
Child Asian
Child Black/African Amer
Child Hawaiian/Pacif
Islander
Child White
Child Unable To Determine
Race
Child Hispanic Origin
Effectiveness Compostive
Variable
Efficiency Composite
Variable
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2

-.006

-.043

-.118

.549

.102

.237

-.030

-.099

.106

.137

-.223

.554

.553

-.039

-.080

-.399

.712

.333

.015

-.082

Appendix H
Structure Matrix-Efficiency and Effectiveness Model

Function
1
Effectiveness Compostive

2

.729*

.278

.636*

-.201

.121*

-.101

.049

-.606*

Child White

-.384

.568*

Child Hispanic Origin

-.078

-.465*

-.117

.465*

.114

.221*

.113

.163*

.006

-.035*

Variable
Child Unable To Determine
Race
Efficiency Composite
Variable
Child Black/African Amer

Child Amer Indian/AK
Native
Child Asian
Child Hawaiian/Pacif
Islander
Child Sex

Pooled within-groups correlations between
discriminating variables and standardized canonical
discriminant functions
Variables ordered by absolute size of correlation
within function.
*. Largest absolute correlation between each variable
and any discriminant function
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Appendix I
AFCARS Codebook
Variable
Number
1
2

Variable Name

Variable Label

DataYear
STATE

The federal fiscal year covered by this dataset
State FIPS Code: The 2-digit FIPS Code for the state reporting the record
Value

Value Label

1
2
4
5
6
8
9
10
11
12
13
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
44
45
46

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
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9

SEX

47
Tennessee
48
Texas
49
Utah
50
Vermont
51
Virginia
53
Washington
54
West Virginia
55
Wisconsin
56
Wyoming
72
Puerto Rico
Child Sex
Value Value Label
1
Male
2
Female
9
Unknown or Missing

10

AMIAKN

Child Amer Indian/AK Native
Value
0
1

11

12

ASIAN

Child Asian

BLKAFRAM

Value Value Label
0
No
1
Yes
Child Black/African AmerICAN
Value
0
1

13

HAWAIIPI

WHITE

UNTODETM

HISORGIN

Value Label
No
Yes

Child Unable To Determine Race
Value
0
1

16

Value Label
No
Yes

Child White
Value
0
1

15

Value Label
No
Yes

Child Hawaiian/Pacif Islander
Value
0
1

14

Value Label
No
Yes

Value Label
No
Yes

Child Hispanic Origin
Value

Value Label
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25

TOTALREM

0
Not applicable
1
Yes
2
No
3
Unable to determine
Total Number Of Removals
The number of times the child was removed from home, including the
current removal.

26

66

NUMPLEP

Number of Placement Settings During the Current FC Episode

DISREASN

The number of places the child has lived, including the current setting,
during the current removal episode. Do not include trial home visits as a
placement setting.
Discharge Reason
Value
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

87
89
90
101
Composite

LatRemLOS
PreviousLOS
LifeLOS
AgedOut
Efficiencyrecode

Length (days) since latest removal date
Length (days) of previous FC stay
Total days stay in FC, all episodes
Exited to Emancipation and Age >= 18
Efficiency
•
•
•

Composite

Effectivenessrecode

Privatization levels

Number of placement settings (numplep)
Total days in foster care (LifeLOS)
Length days previous foster care stay (PreviousLOS)

Effectiveness
•
•
•

Composite

Value Label
Not applicable
Reunified with parent, primary caretaker
Living with other relative(s)
Adoption
Emancipation
Guardianship
Transfer to Another Agency
Runaway
Death of a Child

Total number of removals (TOTALREM)
Exit to Emancipation (AgeOut)
Discharge reason (DISREASN)

State Level of Privatization
Value
1
2
3

Value Label
Fully Privatized
Partially Privatized
Non-Privatized
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